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Cuom o v. Clearing House: Th e Su preme Court Responds to the S ubprim e Financia l Crisis
and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.,1 the Supreme Court held that the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) exceeded its authority when it adopted a regulation (12
C.F .R. § 7.4000) that prohibited state officials from filing lawsuits to enforce applicable state
laws against national banks. The Court upheld the O CC ’s regulation only to the extent that it
bars state authorities from bringing administrative enforcement proceedings against national
banks. Thus, the Court drew a clear distinction between “administrative oversight” of national
banks by state officials – which the Court viewed as preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA)
– and “ju dicial enforcement actions” against national banks by state officials, which the C ourt
found to be consistent with the NBA and the C ourt’s prior decisions. 2
Cuomo arose out of an attempt by the New York Attorney General (NYAG ) to enforce
New Y ork’s fair lending laws against several large national banks that were heavily en gaged in
nonprime mortgage lending. By affirming New York’s authority to enforce its fair lending laws
against national banks through the courts, the Supreme Court exhibited a perspective on banking
regulation that sharply contrasted with the Court’s approach only two years earlier in Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A. 3 In Watters, the Court upheld another OCC regulation (12 C.F.R.

* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I wish to thank the Law School and Dean
Fred Lawrence for a sum mer re search grant that supp orted my wo rk on this boo k chap ter. I also w ish to
express my appreciatio n for the excellent resea rch assistance provided by Christoph er Scott Po llock, a
member of our Law School’s Class of 2010, and by Germaine Leahy, Head of Reference for the Jacob
Burns Law Library. I was the principal author of an amicus brief that was filed in the Cuomo case by an
association of state financial regulators in support of New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.
1
129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
2
Id. at 2721-22.
3
550 U .S. 1 (2007).
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§7.4006), which preempted the application of state laws to nonbank mortgage lending
subsidiaries of national banks.
Watters took a broad view of the preemptive reach of the NB A and indicated that
national banks would not benefit from any supplemental regulation by the states. In Cuomo,
however, the C ourt took great pains to limit the scope and preceden tial force of Watters.
Moreover, Cuomo indicated a renewed appreciation for the historic role of the states in regulating
financial institutions and protecting consum ers. Three members of the Supreme Court (Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter) switched from supporting the OCC in Watters to opposing the OCC
in Cuomo. Evidently, their positions changed because they modified their views about the merits
of the OCC’s preemptive regime and the value of state regulation between April 2007, when
Watters was decided, and June 2009, when Cuomo was issued.
The most plausible explanation for the three Justices’ change in perspective is that they
were influenced by the outbreak of the subprime financial crisis in August 2007 and by
subsequent federal bailouts of several major national banks that were deeply involved in
non prime lending. Amicus briefs filed in support of the NYA G included numerous references to
the financial crisis. In addition, the briefs sharply criticized the OCC for its sweeping preemption
of state law and for its weak record of protecting consumers from abusive lending practices. My
hypothesis that the financial crisis and its aftermath influenced the Court’s decision in Cuomo is
necessarily based on inference, because the majority opinion in Cuomo did not specifically refer
to those events. However, statements made by Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens during oral
argument in Cuomo, and by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Watters, indicate that the
Court was aware of the mortgage crisis and the growing controversy over the OCC’s preemptive
actions.
Cuomo provides much-needed judicial support for (i) the principles of regulatory
federalism inherent in the dual bankin g system and (ii) the im portance of consumer protection in
preserving finan cial stability. Cuomo undermines the legal rationale for several of the OCC ’s
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other preemption rules, and Cuomo reaffirms earlier Supreme Court precedents that upheld the
general applicability of state laws to national banks. Cuomo also supports legislative prop osals
recently advanced by the Obama administration, which seek to preserve the states’ longstanding
role in protecting con sumers of financial services.
During the past decade, the states have been far more proactive than the OCC and other
federal agencies in enacting laws an d bringing en forcement proceedings to protect consumers
against predatory lending and other abusive financial practices. The subprime financial crisis has
demonstrated that effective consumer protection (including the prevention of predatory lending)
is closely linked to the safety and soundness of financial institutions. T he states’ favorable record
of legislation and enforcement over the past decade has confirmed the wisdom of preserving a
federalist system of financial regulation, which includes not only a federal component but also a
supplemental state role in enacting and enforcing consumer protection laws.
The only disap pointing aspect of Cuomo for the states is that the Suprem e Court failed to
resolve a recurring issue about the appropriate level of judicial deference that federal agencies
should receive w hen they claim au thority to preem pt state law. Cuomo did not follow a relatively
demanding, four-part framework for judicial review of agency preemption claims that was
suggested in Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Wyeth v. Levine.4 As explained below, that
four-part framework would strike an appropriate balance between (i) the expectation that
administrative agencies should receive some deference based on their specialized expertise and
(ii) the judiciary’s responsibility to ensure that preemption issues are resolved in accordan ce with
the Constitution’s allocation of federal an d state powers..
Cuomo instead left open the possibility that future preemption claims by federal agencies
could receive a higher level of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National
Resources D efense Council.5 However, the Supreme Court in Cuomo refused to defer to the

4
5

129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
467 U .S. 837 (1984 ).
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OCC’s preemptive rule, based on the Court’s conclusion that Congress did not delegate the
preem ptive power asserted by the OC C. Cuomo may indicate that, even if the Court chooses to
apply Chevron in fu ture cases involving agency preemption claims, the Court will apply a
heightened level of scrutiny under Chevron, particularly with regard to the issue of whether
Congress has affirm atively delegated the preemptive authority alleged by the agency. While
Cuomo does not resolve this im portant question , Cuomo’s broader context reveals that the
policies of all three branches of the federal government have been deeply implicated by the
ongoing finan cial crisis.
Factual and Legal Background of Cuom o v. Clearing House
In 2005, NY AG Eliot Spitzer sent informal letters of inquiry to several large national
banks that were members of The Clearing House Association, L.L.C. (Clearing House). The
recipients of Mr. Spitzer’s letters included Citigroup, H SBC, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo.
Mr. Spitzer’s letters were based on his office’s preliminary analysis of residential mortgage
lending data that the banks released to the public pursuant to the federal Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA ). The banks’ HMDA data “appeared to indicate that a sign ificantly
higher percentage of high-interest home mortgage loans [were] issued to African-American and
Hispanic borrowers than to white borrowers.” 6 Mr. Spitzer’s letters declared that such disparities
“are troub ling on their face, and unless legally justified m ay violate federal and state
antidiscrimination law s such as the Equal Credit O pportunity Act [(ECO A)] and its state
counterpart, New Y ork State E xecutive Law § 296-a.” 7 Like E CO A, § 296-a “broadly prohibits
creditors from discriminating on the basis of sex, national origin, or other protected grounds.” 8
Mr. Spitzer stated that he was sending his letters “[i]n lieu of issuing a formal subpoena,” and he
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requ ested that the recipients voluntarily provide non-public information concernin g their
residential mortgage lending policies and practices in New Y ork.9
The OCC and the Clearing House acknowledged that N.Y. Executive Law § 29 6-a was
not preempted by federal law and therefore applied to national banks.10 This acknowledgment
was consistent with ECO A, which authorizes the states to adopt laws prohibiting discrimination
in lending that are equivalent to, or more protective than, the federal statute.11 The OCC had
previously conceded in March 2004 that state antidiscrimination laws were not substantively
preempted by regulations issued by the O CC in January of that year. The O CC made its
concession in response to an inquiry from Representative Barney Frank, the ranking member of
the Hou se Financial Services Comm ittee, who strongly criticized the OC C’s preem ption rules. 12
Notwithstanding the conceded applicability of N.Y. Executive Law § 296-a to national
banks, the OCC and the Clearing House sued Mr. Spitzer and asserted that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000
preempted his authority to enforce the New York statute against national banks through either
administrative or judicial proceedings. Both parties alleged that any investigative or enforcement
efforts by Mr. Spitzer would constitute “visitorial” activities and would therefore be preempted
by § 7.4000. The district court enjoined Mr. Spitzer from pursuing any type of administrative or
judicial enforcement proceedings against the Clearing House’s member banks. The district
court’s decision was subsequently affirmed by a divided panel of the Second Circuit Court of
9

Id. at 109.
See id. at 114, 120.
11
ECOA prohibits all “creditors” – a catego ry that includ es national banks – fro m disc riminating in credit
transactions on the basis of several characteristics, including race and national origin. 15 U.S.C. §§
1691(a), 169 1a(e). ECO A expressly preserves the states’ authority to enact laws prohibiting lending
discrimination that are consistent with the federal statute. In this regard, ECOA specifically affirms the
states’ po wer to adopt laws that give “greater protection” to borro wers tha n is afford ed under E CO A. Id. §
1691d (f).
12
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 998 (letter from OCC Chief Counsel Julie L. W illiams to Rep. Barney
Frank dated Mar. 9, 2004). For an analysis and critique of the OCC’s 2004 preemption rules, see Arthur E.
W ilmarth, Jr., “The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat
to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,” 23 Annual Review of Banking and Financial Law
225 (2004), available at http://ssrn.co m/ab stract=577 863 . See also infra notes 89-90, 224-29 and
accom panying text (discussing the O CC’s pre emption rules); Karen L. Werner, “Preemption: Frank, House
Democrats Urge OCC to Delay Effective Date of Rulemaking,” 92 Banking Report (BNA) 283 (Feb. 16,
200 4) (describing Re p. Fra nk’s op position to the OC C’s preemption rules).
10

5

Appeals. 13 The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari filed by Mr. Spitzer’s successor,
NY AG Andrew Cuom o.
The OC C’s Regulation and the Def inition of “Visitorial Powers”
The OCC’s regulation at issue in Cuomo prohibited state officials from exercising
“visitorial powers” over national banks. The regulation defined “visitorial powers” to include
any attempt by state officials to conduct investigations or enforce state law s with respect to
“activities authorized or permitted [to national banks] pursuant to federal banking law.” 12
C.F.R. § 7.400 0(a). In January 2004, the OC C amend ed the regulation by extending its ban on
state enforcement actions to reach judicial as well as administrative proceedings.14 The OCC thus
claimed authority to bar state officials from using any forum – including the courts – to enforce
applicable state laws against national banks.
The question presented in Cuomo was whether the OCC ’s expansive definition of
“visitorial powers” w as authorized by the NB A. In an swering that qu estion, the Sup reme C ourt
applied “the familiar Chevron framework” to determine whether the Court should defer to the
OCC’s regulation as a lawful interpretation of the NBA.15 The Cou rt held, in a 5-4 decision
authored by Justice Scalia, that the OCC’s regulation exceeded the agency’s authority to the
extent that it barred state officials from filing lawsuits to enforce valid, non-preempted state laws
against national banks.
The relevant provision of the NBA, 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), states that “[n]o national bank
shall be subject to any visitorial pow ers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts
of justice or . . . exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by [an authorized
congressional committee].” The N BA has included a provision similar to § 484(a) since its
13

Cuomo, 510 F.3d at 109-10. The district court also enjoined NY AG S pitzer from suing national banks
under the Federal H ousing Act (“FHA ”) in the state’s capacity as parens patriae on behalf of New York
citizens. The Second Circuit vacated that portion of the district court’s decision, concluding that the district
court did not have jurisd iction to decid e the FHA issues due to lack of rip eness. Id. at 110, 12 1-26 .
14
69 Federal Register 189 5, 19 04 (200 4) (am ending 12 C.F.R . § 7.4 000 ); see id. at 1895 (declaring that
“state authorities may not achieve indirectly by resort to judicial actions what [the NBA] prohibits them
from achieving directly through state regulatory or supervisory mechanisms”).
15
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715.
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original enactment in 1864.16 Neither § 48 4(a) nor any other section of the NB A defines the term
“visitorial powers.” The majority opinion in Cuomo acknowledged that “[t]there is necessarily
some ambiguity as to the meaning of the statutory term ‘visitorial powers,’ especially since we
are working in an era when the prerogative writs – through which visitorial powers were
traditionally enforced – are not in vogue.” 17 However, Justice Scalia concluded that “[w]e can
discern the outer limits of the term ‘visitorial pow ers’ even through the clouded lens of history,”
based on “[e]vidence from the time of the statute’s enactment, a long line of our own cases, and
application of normal principles of construction to the [NBA ].” 18
The majority and dissenting opinions in Cuomo strongly disagreed over the historical
understan ding of the term “visitorial powers.” In the majority’s view, “[o]ur cases have always
understood ‘visitation’ as [the] right to oversee corporate affairs, quite separate from the power to
enforce the law.” 19 As support for this historical distinction, the majority cited Justice Story’s
concurring opinion in the Supreme Court’s 1819 decision in Dartmouth College. In that case,
Justice Story observed that chancery courts possessed “a general jurisdiction . . . to redress
grievances and fraud” committed by a corporation, but Story explained that the jurisdiction of
chancery courts was not a “visitorial power” and was separate from the “controlling authority of
[the corporation’s] legal visitor.” 20
In his dissenting opinion in Cuomo, Justice Thomas attempted to distinguish Da rtmouth
College on the ground that the college was a ch aritable rather than a civil (for profit) corporation.
Justice Thomas argued that visitors of charitable corporations historically did not have law
enforcement powers, while visitors of civil corporations did possess such powers. Therefore, he

16

See Act of June 3, 1864, c. 78, § 54, 13 Stat. 116.
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715. In his dissenting opinion in Cuomo, Justice Thom as agreed that the term
“visitorial powers” was “ambiguous.” However, he argued that, under Chevron, the ambiguity of the
statute req uired the Co urt to defer to the OCC’s “reaso nable” interp retation of the term . Id. at 2723, 273233 (Tho mas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18
Id at 2715.
19
Id. at 2716.
20
Id. at 2716 (quoting Trustees of D artmo uth Co llege v. Wo odw ard, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 676 (1819)
(Story, J., concurring)).
17

7

contended, Justice Story’s opinion in Dartmouth College did not contradict the OCC’s position
that all law enforcement activities directed at for profit corporations (including national banks)
should be viewed as “visitorial.” 21 Justice Scalia responded to this argument by denying the
significance of any difference between visitors of charitable and for profit corporations. He
concluded that “wh ether or not visitors of charitable corporations had law-enforcement powers,
the powers that they did possess demonstrate that visitation is different from ordinary law
enforcement.”22
In a 1936 law review article, Dean Roscoe Pound pointed out that there was a division of
opin ion in both England and the United States on the question of whether courts of equity
possessed a power to enforce laws against corporations that was independent of the “visitorial”
powers held by the sovereign chartering authority (namely, the British monarch or the national
and state governments of the United States). As Dean Pound explained, the sovereign chartering
authority had the unquestioned right to exercise “visitorial” powers either administratively or by
invoking the jurisdiction of common law cou rts through the prerogative w rits of mandamus, scire
facias and quo warra nto. In contrast, the law enforcement jurisdiction of equity courts over
corporations was not universally recognized. N everth eless, a number of au thorities in both
England and America held that equity courts did have an independent power to enforce
applicable laws against corporations, as indicated by Justice Story’s concurring opinion in
Dartmouth College.23 Dean Pound noted that the NBA appeared to recognize the independent
enforcement power of equity courts by providing that the limitation on “visitorial powers” under
§ 484(a) would not extinguish powers “vested in the courts of justice.” 24
21

Id. at 2724-25 & n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2716 n.1 (majority opinion).
23
Roscoe Pound, “Visitatorial Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity,” 49 Harvard Law Review 369
(1936). Surprisingly, Dean P ound ’s article did not discuss or even cite Justice Story’s op inion in
Dartmouth College.
24
Id. at 389 (citing Rev. Stat. § 5241 (cod ified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)). An antecedent of the
“vested in the courts of justice” clause appeared in § 54 of the original NBA of 1864. Section 54 provided
that the powers “vested in the several courts of law and chancery” would not be disturbed by the general
restriction on the exercise of “visitorial powers” over national banks. Act of June 3, 1864, c. 78, § 54, 13
Stat. 116.
22
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The majority opinion in Cuomo agreed that a decision in favor of allowing state officials
to sue national banks w as “suggested” by the “vested in the courts of justice” clau se in § 484(a).25
In Justice Scalia’s view, that provision’s “only conceivable purpose is to preserve n ormal civil
and criminal lawsuits. . . . [I]t is explicable only as an attempt to make clear that the court’s
ordinary powers of enforcing the law are not affected.” 26
The majority opinion in Cuomo relied heavily on two Supreme Court decisions from the
first quarter of the twentieth century – Guthrie v. Harkness27 and First National Bank in St. Louis
v. Missou ri. 28 Guthrie held that a sharehold er’s su it against a national bank to enforce his right to
inspect corporate records did not involve a prohibited exercise of “visitorial” powers. In Cuomo,
Justice Scalia pointed out that Gu thrie “drew a contrast between the nonvisitorial act of ‘su[ing]
in the courts of the State’ and the visitorial ‘supervision of the [OCC ].’”29 The Court in Gu thrie
placed su bstantial weight on the “courts of justice” clause, observing that “powers . . . ‘vested in
the courts of justice’ . . . are expressly excepted from the inhibition of [§ 484(a)].” 30
St. Louis upheld the right of Missouri (through its attorney general) to bring a quo
warran to action in state court against a national bank for violating Missouri’s anti-branching
law.31 The Court determined in St. Louis that the NB A (as of 1924) did not authorize national
banks to establish branches, except in narrowly limited circum stances that were not relevant to
the case. Accordingly, the Court held that since “the power sought to be exercised by the bank
finds no justification in any law or authority of the United States, the way is open for the
enforcement of the state statute.” 32 The Court rejected the national bank’s claim (supported by

25

Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718.
Id.
27
199 U .S. 148 (1905 ).
28
263 U .S. 640 (1924 ).
29
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717 (quo ting Gu thrie, 199 U.S. at 159).
30
Gu thrie, 199 U.S. at 159.
31
St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 655 (explaining that “the State of Missouri brought this proceeding in the nature of
quo warranto in the State Suprem e Court against the [national bank] to d etermine its authority to establish
and conduct a branch bank in the City of St. Louis. . . . The prayer is that, upon final hearing, the bank be
ousted from the privilege of operating this branch bank or any other”).
32
Id. at 660.
26

9

the United States) that the federal government had exclusive authority to bring a quo warra nto
action to enforce Missouri’s law against the bank. As Justice Scalia explained in Cuomo, the
Court in St. Louis affirmed that “only the United States may perform visitorial administrative
oversight” over national banks, but “if a state statute of general applicability is not substantively
pre-empted, then ‘the power of enforcement must rest with the [State] and not with’ the National
Governm ent.” 33 Justice Scalia concluded that “St. Louis is one of a long and unbroken line of
cases distinguishing visitation from law enforcement.”34
Dean Pound observed that the decision in St. Louis was highly significant in upholding
the authority of a state to maintain a quo warra nto action against a national bank that the state did
not charter. 35 St. Louis cited, and was consistent with, the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in
Standard Oil C o. v. M issou ri. 36 In Standard Oil, the Court affirmed the right of M issouri
(through its attorney general) to prosecute a quo warra nto proceeding in state court against two
out-of-state corporations that violated Missouri’s antitrust statute.37 As Dean Poun d pointed out,
Missouri’s independent authority to sue the national bank in St. Louis was analogous to
Missouri’s power to sue the two foreign corporations in Standard Oil, because Missouri was not
the chartering authority for any of the three corporations and therefore did not possess visitorial
powers over them.38
The majority opinion in Cuomo next turned to the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in
Watters. Watters held that the NBA preempted the application of Michigan’s laws governing
nonbank mortgage lenders to operating subsidiaries of national banks.39 In Cuomo, Justice Scalia

33

Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717 (quoting St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 660).
Id. at 2717 n.2.
35
Pound, supra note 23, at 389.
36
224 U .S. 270 (1912 ).
37
Id. at 272 (e xplaining that M issouri’s quo warranto action requested that “each of the defendants be
ousted of their corporate franchises and license to do business under the laws of [Missouri]” because they
entered into a combination that illegally sought to restrain trade in Missouri). In St. Louis, the Supreme
Court cited Stan dard O il to support its conclusion that a quo warranto proceed ing was consistent with
Missouri law and d id not result in a denial of due p rocess. St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 661 (citing Stan dard O il).
38
Pound, supra note 23, at 389.
39
Watters, 550 U.S. at 15-21.
34
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maintained that Watters “is fully in accord with the well established distinction between
supervision and law enforcement. . . . All parties to the case agreed that Michigan’s general
oversight regime could not be imposed on national banks; the sole question was whether
operating subsidiaries of national banks enjoyed the same immunity from state visitation.” 40
Justice Scalia emphasized that Watters “addresses and answers no other question.” 41
Based upon its review of the Court’s previous cases dealing with “visitorial” powers, the
majority opinion in Cuomo concluded that “the unmistakable and utterly consistent teaching of
our jurisprudence, both before and after enactment of the [NBA], is that a sovereign’s ‘visitorial
powers’ and its power to enforce the law are two different things. . . . [C]ontrary to what the
[OC C’s] regulation says, the [NBA ] pre-empts only the former.” 42
Accordingly, Cuomo held that “visitorial powers . . . include any form of administrative
oversight that allows a sovereign to inspect books and records on demand.” 43 In contrast, a
lawsuit by a state attorney general to enforce state law “is not an exercise of ‘visitorial powers’
and thus the [OCC] erred by extending the definition of ‘visitorial powers’ to include
‘prosecuting enforcement actions’ in state courts.” 44 The Supreme Court upheld the Second
Circuit’s judgment “as applied to the threatened issuance of executive subpoenas” by the NYAG,
but the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment “insofar as it prohibits the [NYAG]
from bringing judicial enforcem ent actions.” 45
Justice Scalia emphasized the “pragmatic” significance of the majority opinion’s
distinction between visitation and judicial enforcement. The OC C as visitor “may inspect books

40

Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717.
Id.
42
Id. In this regard, the majority cited cases finding that “law enforcement by federal agencies” against
national banks did not co nstitute a prohib ited exercise o f “visitorial” p owers. Id. (citing two lower court
opinions). The majority subsequently cited additional cases to show that “States . . . have always enforced
their general laws against national banks – and have enforced their banking-related laws against national
banks for at least 85 years, as e videnced by St. Louis.” Id. at 2720-2 1 (citing, inter alia, Anderson National
Bank v. L uckett, 321 U.S. 233 , 237 , 248 -49 (1 944 )).
43
Id. at 2721.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 2722.
41
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and records at any time for an y or no reason.” 46 In contrast, a state “attorney general acting as a
civil litigant must file a lawsuit, survive a motion to dismiss, endure the rules of procedure and
discovery, and risk sanctions if his claims are frivolous or his discovery tactics abusive.” 47 Courts
could also enter protective orders to prevent unreasonable expense or preju dice to national banks.
In Justice Scalia’s view, courts could be “trusted to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’ or an undirected
rumm aging through bank books” by state officials.48
The Dramatic Contrast between Cuom o and Watters
The majority opinion in Cuomo sharply limited the scope and precedential effect of the
Court’s previous opinion in Watters. As noted above, Cuomo declared that the “sole question”
decided in Watters was “whether operating subsidiaries of national banks enjoyed the same
immunity from state visitation” as national banks possessed, and Cuomo reiterated that Watters
“addresses and answers no other question.” 49
Cuomo’s emphatic pronouncement concerning the narrow scope of Watters echoed
statements made by Justice Ginsburg during the oral argument in Cuomo. Justice Ginsburg wrote
the majority opinion supporting the OCC’s position in Watters, but she joined the majority
opinion striking down the OCC’s regulation in Cuomo. During oral argument in Cuomo, Justice
Ginsburg advised counsel for the Clearing House that “[t]he sole question [in Watters] was
whether . . . the national bank’s operating subsidiary was to be equated with a division of the
national bank. That was the only question provided the Court.” 50 She also admonished counsel
that “I do not think that excerpts from [the Watters] opinion should be taken out of that
context.”51

46

Id. at 2718.
Id. at 2718-19.
48
Id. at 2719.
49
Id. at 2717.
50
Transcript of Oral Argument in Cuomo, at 37 (statement by Justice Ginsburg to Seth P. Waxman,
counsel for the Clearing H ouse), available at
http://www .supremecourtus.gov/o ral_arguments/argument_tran scripts/08-45 3.pd f.
51
Id. at 38 (same).
47
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The majority opinion in Cuomo and Justice Ginsburg’s comments at oral argument
appear to have been consciously design ed to limit the precedential force of Watters in future
cases raising preemption issues under the NBA. The Cuomo majority might have been concerned
about certain statements in Watters that indicated an expansive view of the NB A’s preemptive
effect. 52 Not surprisingly, the Clearing House quoted those statements in its brief in Cuomo.53
During oral argument in Cuomo, Justice Ginsburg stated that she viewed the Clearing House’s
discussion of Watters in its brief as “an inaccurate description of what that opinion held.” 54
Du ring oral argument, Justice Souter similarly questioned the OCC ’s assertion that a
1994 statute, 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B), granted the OCC exclusive authority to enforce state laws
against interstate branches of national banks. Justice Souter suggested that the text and legislative
history of the 1994 statute did not clearly manifest a con gressional purpose to bar state officials
from enforcing valid, non-preempted state laws against interstate branches of national banks. If
Congress had plainly stated that intent, Justice Souter said that he would have expected such an
“extraordinary” displacement of state enforcement authority to produce “rather a dust-up.” The
fact that Section 36(f)(1)(B) failed to trigger any substantial controversy created what Justice
Souter described as “kind of a ‘dog that didn’t bark’ argument” and, therefore, led him to doubt
the OCC’s exclusivity claim.55
52

See W atters, 550 U.S. at 11 (“federal control [und er the N BA ] shields national banking from und uly
burd ensome and duplicative state regulation ”); id. at 13 (“state law may not significantly burden a national
bank’s own exercise of its real estate lending p owers, just as it may not curtail or hinder a national bank’s
efficient exercise o f any othe r power, incidental or enumera ted under the NB A”).
53
See Brief of Respondent Clearing House Ass’n in Cuomo, at 29 & n.5 (quoting Watters, 550 U.S. at 11,
13).
54
Transcript of Oral Argument in Cuomo, supra note 50, at 37 (statement by Justice Ginsburg to Mr.
W axman).
55
Id. at 31-32 (colloquy between Justice Souter and Malcolm L. Stewart, counsel for the OCC). Section
36(f)(1)(B) provides that four specific categories of state laws applicable to interstate branches of national
banks “shall be enforced” by the OCC. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B). The OCC argued that the words “shall be
enforced” were intended to give the OCC exclusive power to enforce those state laws against national bank
branches. Id. at 25-26 (argument of Mr. Stew art). NYAG Cuom o contended that the purpose o f the clause
was to direct the O CC to exercise its concurrent authority to enforce applicable state laws against national
bank branches, because C ongress believed that the O CC was improperly ignoring those laws. Id. at 13
(argument of Barbara D. U nderwood, counsel for M r. Cuomo). The m ajority opinion in Cuomo concluded
that the terms of Section 36(f)(1)(B) “shed no light on the meaning of ‘visitorial powers’ in the National
Bank Act, a statute that it does not refer to and that was enacted more than a century earlier.” Cuomo, 129
S. Ct. at 2718 n.3. In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Cuomo maintained that Section 36(f)(1)(B)
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Justice Ginsburg also indicated her apprehension about the potentially far-reaching scope
of the OCC’s claim of exclusive enforcement authority over national banks. During the oral
argument in Cuomo, she asked counsel for the Clearing House wh ether the O CC ’s exclusivity
claim applied not only to “core banking activities” but also to “matters incidental to banking.” 56
Counsel responded that the OCC ’s exclusivity claim “would [apply] if those incidental authorities
are in fact authorized, approved an d regulated by the OC C.” 57
Justice Ginsburg’s inquiry was apparently prompted by her concern that the OCC might
assert exclusive enforcement authority over the full range of national bank activities that the OCC
deemed to fall within the “incidental powers . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking”
under 12 U .S.C . § 24 (Seventh). Ju stice G insburg wrote the Suprem e Court’s 1995 decision in
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC).58 In VALIC, the C ourt held
that an OCC opinion letter, which approved a bank activity as falling within the “incidental
powers” of national banks, was entitled to ju dicial deference under Chevron.59 However, the
Court caution ed the OCC that “[t]he exercise of the [agency’s] discretion . . . must be kept within
reasonable bounds” and should not include “[v]entures distant from dealing in financial
investment instruments.” 60 Amicus briefs filed in Cuomo by a realtors’ association and by
consumer groups informed the Court that, notwithstanding the cautionary language in VALIC, the
OCC had expansively construed the “incidental powers” of national banks. For example, the
OC C issued rulings that approved such far-flung activities as “providing coun seling to M edicare
and Medicaid recipients, selling long-term care and disability insurance, operating roadside
assistance programs, finding customers for automobile sales, developing commercial buildings

“reinforces OCC’s interpretation of § 484(a).” Id. at 2728 n.2. (Thom as, J., dissenting in part).
56
Transcript of Oral Argument in Cuomo, supra note 50, at 48 (question by Justice Ginsburg to Mr.
W axman).
57
Id. (statement by M r. Waxman). C ounsel add ed that “this case doe sn’t require [the Court] to address”
the issue of incidental activities, because Cuomo involved real estate lending, “an express power [of
national banks] under [12 U.S.C.] section 371(a).” Id. at 48-49.
58
513 U .S. 251 (1995 ) (“VALIC ”).
59
Id. at 257.
60
Id. at 259 n.2.
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and managing residential cond ominiums in those buildings, dispensing various prepaid products
... through their A TM machines, operating a ‘virtual mall’ w here bank cu stomers ‘can sh op for a
range of financial and non-financial products and services,’ and providing ‘Web design and
development services.’”61
As the consumer groups’ brief pointed out, the OCC had published a compilation of
national bank powers in which the OCC declared that “[t]he business of banking is an evolving
concept and the permissible activities of national banks similarly evolve over time.” 62 At oral
argument in Cuomo, Justice G insburg noted that “today national banks have a lot of . . . authority
to do things incidental to banking.” 63 Justice Ginsburg evidently understood that the OCC w as
continually expanding the scope of “incidental powers” for national banks under the NBA.
Thus, comments by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter during oral argument in Cuomo
foreshadowed their shift from a pro-OCC position in Watters to an anti-OCC position in Cuomo.
Justice Breyer was the only member of the Cuomo majority who did not indicate any doub ts
about the OCC ’s position during the oral argument. Like Justice G insburg and Justice Souter,
Justice Breyer supported the OCC in Watters. In addition, Justice Breyer expressed misgivings
during oral argument in Cuomo about the potential disadvantages of allowing state attorneys
general to second-guess the enforcement decisions of the OCC.64 His decision to join the
majority opinion in Cuomo was therefore som ewhat surprising.

61

Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors in Support of Petitioner in Cuomo, at at 17-18 (citing and
quo ting OCC, Activities Permissible for a National Bank, 2007 (2008)); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Center for Responsible Lending et al. in Support of Petitioner in Cuomo, at 12 (same).
62
Brief of Amici Curiae Center for R espo nsible L ending et al., supra note 61, at 13 (quoting OCC,
Activities Permissible for a National Bank, 2007, at 1 (2008)). Similarly, the OCC’s Chief Counsel and
Assistant Chief Counsel proclaimed in a 1997 article that “the business of banking is in a constant state of
evolution.” Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., “The Business of Banking: Looking to the
Future—Part II,” 52 Business Lawyer 1279, 12 99 (199 7). They further contended that OCC decisions
defining the “incidental powers” of national banks “provide key authority for national banks to transform
their banking franchises in ways that will be necessary to enable them to compete and effectively serve
customers in the financial arena of the future.” Id. at 1331.
63
Transcript of Oral Argument in Cuomo, supra note 50, at 48 (statement by Justice Ginsburg).
64
Id. at 6-11 (colloquies between Justice Breyer and B arbara D. Und erwood, counsel for Mr. Cuom o).
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The majority opinion in Cuomo criticized the OCC for adopting an aggressive theory of
preemption that “attempts to do what Congress declined to do: exem pt national banks from all
state banking law s, or at least state enforcement of those laws.” 65 In view of the virtually
unboun ded theories of “incidental powers” and preemption advanced by the OCC, the Cuomo
majority may have decided to include in Cuomo a narrow ly circumscribed reading of Watters in
order to curtail the OCC ’s ability to assert similar preemption claims in the future. As discussed
in the next section of this chapter, it also seems likely that the Cuomo majority was resp ond ing to
the subprime financial crisis and federal bailouts of several leading national banks. Those
developm ents may have caused the majority to lose confidence in the OCC’s policy judgmen ts,
particularly with regard to the desirability of preempting state enforcement of mortgage lending
laws, an issue that was central to both Watters and Cuomo.
In sharp contrast to the broad preemptive language used by the Court in Watters, the
majority opinion in Cuomo indicated a renewed appreciation for federalism and the potentially
beneficial effects of a supplemental state role in regulating financial institutions. Justice Scalia
pointed out that “[n]o one denies that the [NBA] leaves in place some state substantive law
affecting banks.” 66 He further observed that “States . . . have always enforced their general laws
against national banks – and have enforced their banking-related laws against national banks for
at least 85 years, as evidenced by St. Louis.” 67 The foregoing statements in Cuomo are consistent
with the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Atherton v. FD IC,68 where the Court declared that
“federally chartered banks are subject to state law.” 69 As support for that principle, Atherton
quoted decisions reaching back to an 1870 case – decided only six years after the NBA ’s
enactment – where the Court held that national banks

65
66
67
68
69

Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2720.
Id. at 2717-18.
Id. at 2720.
519 U .S. 213 (1997 ).
Id. at 222.
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are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of
business far more by the law s of the State than of the nation. A ll their contracts
are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of
property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts,
are all based on S tate law. It is only when State law incapacitates the [n ational]
banks from discharging their duties to the federal government that it becomes
unconstitutional. 70
In St. Louis, the Supreme Court explained that “the operation of general state laws upon
the dealings and contracts of national banks” is the “rule,” while preemption is an “exception”
that applies only when state laws “expressly conflict with the laws of the United States or
frustrate the purpose for w hich national banks were created, or impair their efficien cy to
discharge the duties imp osed upon them by the law of the United States.” 71 Similarly, in
Anderson National Bank v. Luckett,72 the Court held that “national banks are subject to state laws,
unless those laws infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on the
perform ance of the ban ks’ functions.” 73 In Cuomo, the Court cited St. Louis and Luckett with
approval,74 and both decisions therefore retain strong precedential value with respect to future
preemption cases under the NBA.
In Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,75 the Court held that the NBA em bodies a
congressional “policy of equalization” between the national and state banking systems. 76
Congress has long sought to preserve the vitality of the dual banking system by maintaining a
basic parity of competitive opportunities between state and national banks. 77 This congressional
policy of equalization has been carried out in two ways – first, by “expressly incorporat[ing]
state-law stand ards into several federal statutes,” an d second , “through statutory silence [that]
70

Id. at 222-23 (quoting National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870)). In a 1996
decision, the Supreme Court similarly held that “States [retain] the power to regulate national banks, where
. . . doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.”
Barnett B ank of M arion County, N.A. v. Nelso n, 517 U .S. 25, 33 (1996).
71
St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 656 (quoting Mc Clellan v. Chipm an, 164 U .S. 347, 357 (189 6)).
72
321 U .S. 233 (1944 ).
73
Id. at 248.
74
See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717, 2718, 2720-21.
75
292 U .S. 559 (1934 ).
76
Id. at 564-65.
77
See W ilmarth, supra note 12, at 253-65.
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permits state laws to govern other aspects of the operations of national banks except in situations
where a state law creates an irreconcilable conflict with federal law.” 78 Cuomo did not cite Lew is,
but Justice Stevens quoted Lewis with approval in his dissenting opinion in Watters.79
The Cuomo majority held that the OC C erred in asserting that “the State may not enforce
its valid, non -preempted law s against national banks. T he bark remains, but the bite does not.”80
The Cuomo majority described this result as “[b]izarre,” particularly in view of the Court’s
statement in St. Louis that it would be a “fallacy” to acknowled ge “the binding quality of a statute
but deny the power of enforcement.” 81 Indeed, St. Louis declared that the “power [of
enforcement] is essentially inheren t in the very con ception of law.” 82
During oral argument in Cuomo, Justice Ginsburg similarly found it “passing strange” for
the O CC to maintain that “State . . . substantive law [is] applicable to [national] banks but only
the Federal authority can enforce it.” 83 Justice G insburg asked counsel for the O CC if there were
any comparable federal statutes in which Congress recognized the applicability of state laws but
gave federal officials exclusive authority to enforce those laws. Counsel was unable to identify
any such federal statute.84
In contrast to the “[b]izarre” outcome created by the O CC ’s regulation, Justice Scalia
maintained that an “entirely commonplace result” would be produced b y interpreting § 484(a) as
“[c]hanneling state attorneys general into judicial law enforcement proceedings . . . [while]
preserv[ing] a regim e of exclusive administrative oversight by the [OCC ].” 85 Justice Scalia
explained that such an outcome “echoes many other mixed state/federal regimes in which the
Federal Governm ent exercises general oversight while leaving state substantive law in p lace.” 86
78

Id. at 266. See Lew is, 292 U.S. at 564 -65, 5 66 (describing b oth method s for ap plying state laws to
national banks).
79
Watters, 550 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, J.).
80
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct.. at 2718.
81
Id. at 2718 (quoting St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 660).
82
St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 660 , quoted in Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718.
83
Transcript of Oral Argument in Cuomo, supra note 5 0, at 27 .
84
Id. at 27-28 (colloquy among Justice Ginsburg, Malcolm L. Stewart and Justice Scalia).
85
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718.
86
Id.
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In this regard, the Cuomo majority cited the Court’s recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine,87
discussed below, in which the Court held that the federal statutory regime governing labeling of
prescription drugs did not preempt failure-to-warn claims based on state tort law. Thus, in
marked contrast to Watters, the majority opinion in Cuomo interpreted the NBA in light of the
strong federalism principles applied in cases such as St. Louis, Lewis, Luckett, Atherton and
Wyeth.
The Impact of the Subprime Financial Crisis and the OCC’s Weak Record of Enforcing
Consumer Protection Laws
The outbreak of the subprime financial crisis in August 2007 and subsequent federal
bailouts of several leading national banks apparently changed the Supreme C ourt’s assessment of
the desirability of OCC preemption between the dates of the Court’s decisions in Watters (April
17, 2007) and Cuomo (June 29, 2009). Amicus briefs filed in support of NYAG Cuomo
contained numerous references to the financial crisis. In addition, those briefs sharply attacked
the OCC for its sweeping preemp tion of state law and its alleged failure to p rotect consumers
from predatory lending. Although the majority opinion in Cuomo did not directly refer to the
financial crisis, other evidence indicates that the Court was aware of the crisis and the con troversy
surrounding the OC C’s preem ption efforts.
Criticisms of the OCC’s Preemptive Actions and Supervisory Record
Am icus briefs filed in support of NYA G C uom o strongly criticized the OCC for (i)
failing to protect consumers against ab usive mortgage lending practices by national banks and (ii)
preem pting the states’ efforts to protect consumers. Am ici – who included members of Congress,
state officials, civil rights organizations and consumer groups – contended that the OCC’s
preemptive actions and supervisory failures were a significant factor leading to the subprime
financial crisis.88
87

129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
See, e.g., the following amicus briefs filed in Cuomo to support NYAG C uomo: Brief of Members of
Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 3-8 (filed by six members of Congress, including
Rep. Barney Frank); Brief for the States o f North C arolina et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at
8-14, 22-25, 33-39 (filed by the attorneys general of 49 states and the District of Columbia); Brief of the
88
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As am ici pointed out, the OC C issued a series of preemptive rules and orders that barred
the states from enforcing a wide range of state laws – including state anti-predatory lending laws
and other consumer protection laws – against national banks an d their operating subsidiaries. 89
The OCC’s rulings had the cumulative effect of “cancel[ing] out much state-level consumer
protection law.” 90
Am ici cited studies showing that the OCC had powerful budgetary incentives to use
preem ption as a marketing tool to persuade the largest banks to operate under national charters.
The OCC’s budget is funded almost entirely by assessments paid by national banks, and the
biggest banks pay the highest assessments. 91 A former head of the OCC described preemption as
“a significant benefit of the national [bank] charter – a benefit that the OC C has fought hard over
the years to preserve.” 92 In response to the OCC ’s preemption campaign, several large, m ultistate
banks converted from state to national charters, thereby producing a significant increase in the
OC C’s assessment revenues. 93
American Ass’n of Re sidential Mo rtgage Reg ulators as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 1-2, 1721 (filed by an organization of state officials who regulate mortgage lenders, servicers and brokers); Brief
of the Conference of State B ank Sup ervisors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 3-4, 17-21, 28-32
(filed by an organization of state officials who regulate state-chartered banks); B rief of Lawyers’
Com mittee for Civil Rights under Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 1-4, 20-22, 26-38
(brief filed by three civil rights gro ups); B rief Amici Curiae of Center for Resp onsible Lending et al., supra
note 61 (amicus brief filed by nine consumer groups and New York City’s Department of Consumer
Affairs)..
89
See, e.g.., 66 F ed. R eg. 28 ,593 (2001) (order declaring that M ichigan laws, whic h required car dealers to
obtain lending licenses and comply with M ichigan consum er protection laws if they arranged auto loans,
were preempted by the NB A with respect to car dealers who acted as agents of national banks in arranging
auto loans); 66 Federal Reg ister 34,784 (20 01) (adopting 12 C.F.R. § 7.400 6, which preempted the
application of state laws to operating subsidiaries of national banks); 68 Federal Register 46,264 (2003)
(preemption determination declaring that the Georgia Fair Lending Act was completely preempted by
federal law as to national banks and their operating subsidiaries); 69 Federal Register 1904 (2004)
(adopting 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007-7.4009 and 34.4, which preempted all state laws that “obstruct, impair, or
condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized powers” in four broadly-defined
areas – real estate lending, len ding not secu red b y real estate, dep osit-taking, and o ther “operations”).
90
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, “Making Credit Safer,” 157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
1, 82 (2008 ).
91
Id. at 93-94; W ilmarth, supra note 12, at 276.
92
Speech b y Comptroller of the Currency John D. H awke, Jr., Feb . 12, 2 002 , quoted in W ilmarth, supra
note 12, at 236, 274.
93
Bar-Gill & W arren, supra note 9 0, at 81 -83, 9 3-94 (citing charter co nversio ns by thre e large banks in
2004 and 2005, which moved $1 trillion of assets from the state banking system to the national banking
system and produced a 15% increase in the O CC’s budget); W ilmarth, supra note 12, at 233-36, 274-79,
289-93.
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In addition, studies cited by amici described the OCC’s record of enforcing consumer
protection laws as a “long history of inaction,” “relatively lax,” “weak” and “unimpressive.” 9 4
Publicly available information indicated that, during 1995-2007, the O CC issued only 13 public
enforcement orders against national banks for violations of consumer protection laws. 9 5 Most of
those enforcement orders were issued against small national banks, and only one order included a
charge that the bank violated state laws.9 6 In that one case, the OCC took action only after the
public became aware that a California prosecutor was investigating the offending bank. 9 7
The states’ record of protecting consumers presen ted a dramatic contrast with the OCC .
Between 199 9 and 200 6, more than thirty states enacted laws to combat predatory lending. 9 8 A
recent study found that state anti-predatory laws reduced the number of mortgages with unsound
or abusive features such as prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and no- and lowdocum entation terms. 99 In addition, state officials vigorously used their enforcement powers to
prosecute financial service providers for a wide range of unlawful practices. 1 0 0 In 2003 alone,
“state bank supervisory agencies performed m ore than 20,000 investigations in response to

94

Bar-Gill & W arren, supra note 90, at 90-95 (quote at 94); Christopher L. Peterson, “Federalism and
Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda,” 78 Temple Law Review 1, 70-74, 77-81 (2005)
(quote at 81); Amy Quester & K athleen Keest, “Looking Ahead After Watters v. Wachovia Bank:
Challenges for the Lower Courts, Congress, and the Comptroller of the Currency,” 27 Review of Banking &
Financial Law 187 , 195 -97 (2 008 ) (quo te at 19 5); W ilmarth, supra note 12, at 232 (quote), 274-77, 289-93,
310-16, 351-56.
95
See Bar-Gill & W arren, supra note 9 0, at 92 -93; W ilmarth, supra note 1 2, at 35 3, 35 5-56 ; Steph anie
Mencimer, “No Account,” New Rep ublic, Aug. 27, 2007, at 14.
96
In re P rovid ian N ation al Ba nk, June 28, 2000 , 2000 O CC E nf. Dec. LEXIS 55 , at *1 (alleging violations
of California statutes pro hibiting unfair business practices); see also W ilmarth, supra note 12, at 353-56.
97
W ilmarth, supra note 12, at 316 & n.357; “Correspondence,” New Rep ublic, Oct. 8, 2007, at 7 (resp onse
by Stephanie Mencimer to letter from Co mptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan).
98
Julia Patterson Forrester, “Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and
Federally Supported Lenders,” 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1303, 1308-10, 1319-22, 1359-68
(2006); Patricia A. McC oy et al., “Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and
Regulatory Failure,” 41 Connecticut Law Review 1327, 13 48 (200 9).
99
Raphael W. Bostic et al., “Mortgage Product Substitution and State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: Better
Loans and Better Borrowers?” (May 12, 2009), Univ. of Pa. Instit. for Law & Econ. Res. Paper 09-27, at
19-2 4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460871.
100
Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 316, 348-52, 354-55; Amir Efrati & Aaron Lucchetti, “U.S. News: Cuomo
Blazes Own Trail as Wall Street Cop,” Wa ll Street. Jo urnal, Aug. 11, 2008 , at A3; Brooke M asters, “In
Spitzer’s footsteps: Cuomo trains his sights on financial services,” Financial Times, June 5, 2007, at 1.
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consu mer complaints about abu sive lending practices, and those investigations produced more
than 4 ,000 enforcement actions.” 1 0 1
Despite these initiatives by the states, the OCC’s actions seriously obstructed the states’
ability to protect consumers from predatory lending practices. In addition to adopting preemptive
regulations, the OCC filed amicus briefs in many other cases to support efforts by national banks
to obtain judicial decisions preempting state consumer protection laws. The OCC ’s decision to
sue NYAG Spitzer, in concert with the Clearing House (whose members included most of the
largest national banks), provided a striking example of the O CC ’s unrelenting efforts to support
its regulated constituents and to block efforts by state officials to enforce state laws against those
constituents. 102
By preempting state laws and state enforcement proceedings, the OCC (i) undermined the
effectiveness of state predatory lending laws, 103 and (ii) contributed to the severity of the current
credit crisis by “stifling . . . prescient state enforcers and legislators” who tried to prevent
irresponsible lending. 104 For example, the OC C issued rulings declaring that Georgia officials
were preempted from applying the Georgia Fair Lending Act not only to national banks and their
operating subsidiaries, but also to mortgage brokers who arranged loans funded at closing by
national banks or their subsidiaries.105 Similarly, after state officials brought enforcement actions
101

W ilmarth, supra note 1 2, at 31 6 (quoting 200 4 H ouse budget committee do cument); see also Eric
Nalder, “Mortgage System Crumbled While Regulators Jousted,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 11, 2008,
at A1 (repo rting that “States . . . took 3,69 4 enfo rcem ent actio ns against mortgage lenders and brokers in
2006 alone, accord ing to congressional testimony”).
102
Bar-Gill & W arren, supra note 9 0, at 91 ; Quester & Keest, supra note 9 4, at 19 9; W ilmarth, supra note
12, at 289 -93, 3 53-5 5; M encim er, supra note 95 (citing an informal survey indicating that the OCC filed 60
amicus briefs in court cases from 1994 to 2006 , “at least 58 of which were in support of [national] banks”);
supra notes 6-13 and accompa nying text (discussing the d ecision by the O CC and the Clearing H ouse to
sue Mr. Spitzer).
103
Bar-Gill & W arren, supra note 9 0, at 81 -82, 9 0-95 ; Forrester, supra note 98, at 1339-42, 1349-53;
Quester & Keest, supra note 9 4, at 22 3-37 ; W ilmarth, supra note 1 2, at 30 6-16 , 348 -52.
104
Robert Berner & Brian Grow, “They Warned Us: The W atchdogs Who Saw the Subprime Disaster
Coming – and How They W ere Thwarted by the Banks and Washington,” Business Week, Oct. 20, 2008, at
36, 3 8; see also Nicholas Bagley, “Subprime Safeguards We Needed,” Wash ington Post, Jan. 25, 2008, at
A19; Nalder, supra note 101.
105
OCC Preemption De termination and Ord er, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003); OC C Interpretive
Letter No. 1002, M ay 13, 2004, from Co mptroller of the Currency John D. H awke, Jr. to Georgia Banking
Commissioner David G . Sorrell.
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and imposed heavy penalties against two major nonbank mortgage lenders (Household and
Ameriquest), those organizations sold themselves to large national banks (HSBC and Citigroup)
and thereby obtained substantial protection from further state regulation. A comparable incident
occurred in 2006, when the Iow a Division of Banking sued Okoboji Mortgage for refusing to
coop erate w ith the state’s investigation of susp ected illegal len ding practices. Okoboji promptly
sold itself to a large national bank (Wells Fargo) and then claimed immunity from any further
state enforcement proceedings. 106
The OC C’s preem ption rules closely paralleled regulations that the O ffice of Thrift
Supervision (“OTS”) issued between 1983 and 1996 . The OTS regulations preempted a broad
range of state laws from applying to federal thrifts and their operating subsidiaries. Like the
OC C, the OTS issued additional rulings that specifically preempted the application of state
predatory lending laws to federal thrifts and their subsidiaries and agents. Again like the OCC,
the OTS has strong financial incentives to use preemption as a means of attracting large,
multistate institutions to its chartering regime, because virtually all of the OTS’s budget is
financed by assessments and fees paid by federal thrifts. Given those incentives, it is not
surprising that the OTS’s record of initiating public enforcement actions against its regulated
constituen ts for violating consum er protection laws is as sparse as the O CC ’s score sheet. 107
The preemptive actions of the OCC and OT S preven ted state officials from respond ing to
predatory lending problems with the same effectiveness they displayed in exposing a series of
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Brief of North Carolina et al. in Cuomo, supra note 88, at 11-12; Erick Portanger et al., “Buying
American: HSBC to Acquire Lender in Big Bet on U.S. Economy,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 2002, at
A1; Harry Terris, “Citi-ACC: A Bet Vertical Integration Still Has Legs,” American Banker, Sept. 13, 2007,
at 1; B erner & G row, supra note 104, at 41-42 (describing incident involving Okoboji M ortgage).
107
W ilmarth, supra note 1 2, at 22 8, 23 3-35 , 280 -87 (d iscussing the OTS ’ preemptio n initiatives, an d their
similarity to the OCC’s preemptive actions); State Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336 (2008)
(upholding an OT S ruling that permitted agents of a federal thrift to offer mortgage loans in Ohio without
com plying with Ohio’s laws governing m ortgage brokers); Office of Thrift Supervision, Annua l Rep ort,
Fisca l Year 200 8, at 43, ava ilable a t http://files.ots.treas.gov/482008.pdf (showing that 95% of the OTS’
budget is funded by assessments and fees paid by federal thrifts). For discussions of the OTS’ weak record
of enfo rcing consumer p rotection laws against federa l thrifts, see M cCo y, supra note 98, at 1348-57;
Nalder, supra note 10 1 (repo rting that the OT S initiated only “five to six” enforcement actions against
federal thrifts for unfair and deceptive practices between 2000 and 2008).
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scandals on Wall Street between 2002 and 2006. State authorities took the lead in prosecuting
securities firms (including securities affiliates of major banks) for pressuring their research
analysts to produce biased reports to investors, for engaging in corrupt practices related to initial
public offerings, and for perm itting hedge funds to carry out abusive m arket tim ing and late
trading strategies that exploited mutual funds sponsored by securities firms. The Securities and
Exchange Comm ission (SEC) cooperated with the states’ en forcement measures against Wall
Street firms.108 In contrast, as shown above, the OCC and OT S repeatedly issued preemptive
rulings and intervened in lawsuits to block efforts by state officials to enforce state anti-predatory
lending laws against federally-chartered depository institutions and their subsidiaries and agents.
The Supreme Court was evidently aware of the public controversy over the OC C’s
aggressive preemptive actions and its questionable commitment to protecting consumers when
the Court considered both Watters and Cuomo. As indicated above, remarks by Justices
Ginsburg and Souter at the Cuomo oral argument indicated that they had serious misgivings about
the OCC ’s far-reaching assertions of preem ptive authority. 109 In addition, at the oral arguments in
both Watters and Cuomo, Justice Stevens asked pointed questions about the number of personnel
that the OC C assigned to its enforcement and compliance functions. Those questions suggested
that Justice Stevens had significant doubts about the OC C’s commitment to consumer
protection.110
In addition, Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Watters strongly criticized the Court
for upholding an OCC regulation, 12 C.F.R . § 7.4006, that barred the states from regulating statechartered mortgage lending companies that were operating subsidiaries of national banks. Justice
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Stevens declared that “[i]t is especially troubling that the Court so blithely preempts Michigan
laws designed to protect consumers. Consumer protection is quintessentially a ‘field which the
States have traditionally occupied.’”111 In addition, Justice Stevens warned that “the OCC’s
regulation may drive companies seeking refuge from state regulation into the arms of federal
parents, harm those state competitors who are not lucky enough to find a federal benefactor, and
hamstring States’ ability to regulate the affairs of state corporations.” 112
The OC C’s Unfound ed Attack on the States
In response to the strong attacks on its preemptive actions and its consumer protection
record, the OCC attem pted to shift the blame for the sub prime mortgage debacle to the states. In
Cuomo, six former Comptrollers of the Currency filed an amicus brief in support of the OCC and
the Clearing House. The former Comptrollers alleged that (i) nonbank mortgage lenders and
brokers bore most of the blame for the subprime financial crisis, and (ii) nonbank lenders and
brokers “are – and always have been – subject to the oversight and enforcement jurisdiction of
state officials.” The former Comptrollers further claimed that “the OCC provided early and
unm atched leadership on subp rime lending.” 113 Similarly, in congressional testimony presented
in March 2009, the incumbent Comptroller of the Currency declared that nonbank lenders and
brokers “have been widely recognized as the overwhelming source of abusive subprime
mortgages.” He also contended that “national banks were not significant originators of subprime
loans.” 114
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The OC C’s attempt to blame the states for the current financial crisis is un persuasive.
Nonbank lenders and brokers did play a significant role in originating sub prime and A lt-A
mortgages. However, as discussed above, the OCC and OTS barred the states from regulating
nonbank lenders and brokers that were affiliated with national banks. In addition, national banks
and federal thrifts acquired several of the largest nonbank mortgage lenders between 1999 and
2007. For example, HSBC bought Household, Citigroup purchased Associates First Capital and
Argent (the parent of Ameriquest), Washington Mutual (Wamu) bought Long Beach M ortgage
and National City purchased First Franklin.115
A recent Federal Reserve stud y found that depository institu tions (together w ith their
subsidiaries and other affiliates) accounted for about half of nonprime (subprime and Alt-A)
mortgages originated in 2004 and 2005, 54 percent of nonprime mortgages in 2006, and 79
percent of nonprime mortgages in 2007.116 This accelerating shift in nonprime loan originations
toward national banks and federal thrifts and their affiliates reflected the growing impact of the
OCC’s and O TS’ preemp tion rules. Those preemption rules shielded federally-chartered
institutions and their operating subsidiaries from state predatory lending laws, while unaffiliated
nonbank lenders remained subject to state laws. 117
A study by the National Consumer Law Center found that national banks, federal thrifts
and their operating subsidiaries accounted for 31.5% of subprime mortgage loans, 40.1% of AltA loans, and 51.0% of payment-option and interest-only adjustable-rate mortgages (AR Ms)
originated in 2006.118 A second study, by the Center for Public Integrity, confirmed that large
115
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national banks and federal thrifts (along with their affiliates) ranked among the biggest funding
sources for subprime mortgages between 2005 and 2 007. The largest subprime lender during that
period was C ountrywide. Countrywide operated as a national bank from 2001 to 2007 and as a
federal thrift from 2007 to 2008, at wh ich point it was forced – on the brink of insolvency – to
enter into an emergency merger w ith Bank of A merica (B ofA).119
In addition to Countrywide, the top 25 sources of funding for subprime mortgages
between 2005 and 2007 included seven big national banks (Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, HSBC,
Wachovia, Wells Fargo, National City and Capital One), two large federal thrifts (Wamu and
IndyMac), three major Wall Street firms, which each controlled a federal thrift (Merrill Lynch,
Lehman B rothers and Bear Stearns), and a big insurance company that also controlled a federal
thrift (Am erican International G roup (AIG)).120 Those three Wall Street firms an d AIG were
subject to consolidated supervision by the OT S because of their ownership of federal thrifts.121
Many of the same financial institutions were heavily involved in Alt-A lending, as was
BofA. Alt-A mortgages included some of the most risky loans, including low- and nodocum entation mortgages (frequently called “liars’ loans”) and payment option ARM s.122 In
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addition to their direct nonprime lending activities, national banks, federal thrifts and Wall Street
firms provided indirect funding for subprime and Alt-A loans by furnishing wholesale lines of
credit to nonbank lenders such as Ameriquest, New Century and Option One. When the major
wholesale lenders cut off their lines of credit in 2007, many nonbank mortgage lenders and
mortgage brokers quickly went out of business. The rapid disappearance of nonbank lenders and
brokers confirmed that they were acting as conduits for the big national banks, federal thrifts and
Wall Street firms. 123
The largest federally-regulated financial institutions also created and marketed complex
financial instruments whose performance was linked to nonprime mortgages, including
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS ), collateralized debt obligations (CDO s) and credit
default swaps (CDS). Financial giants used CDOs and CDS to place multiple bets on nonprime
mortgages and to facilitate the worldwide marketing of investment-grade securities derived from
pools of nonprime mortgages. RM BS, CD Os and C DS m agnified the impact of defaults on
nonprime mortgages and triggered a global contagion of losses when the U.S. housing market
collapsed. The OCC and the OTS, along with other federal regulators (including the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) and the SEC) failed to control the risks inherent in nonprime mortgages as
well as the aggravation of those risks in RMBS, CDOs and CDS. 124
The failures and federal bailouts of several large national banks, federal thrifts and W all
Street firms revealed (i) the deep involvement of those institutions in the nonprime mortgage
in the third quarter of 2007); “Top Alt-A Lenders in First Half of 2007,” National Mortgage News, Sept.
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debacle and (ii) serious regulatory failures by the OCC, the OTS and other federal regulators. On
the OCC ’s side of the regulatory ledger, four of the sixteen largest national banks would have
failed absent costly federal bailouts. The largest and third-largest national banks (BofA and
Citigroup) suffered huge losses from nonprime-related activities and received mammoth bailout
packages from the federal government, including $90 billion of capital infusions and more than
$400 billion of asset price guarantees. 125
In addition, the fourth-largest and sixteenth-largest national banks (Wachovia and
National City) were pushed to the brink of failure by heavy losses resulting from risky nonprime
lending. Federal regulators arranged a “hasty sale” of Wachovia to Wells Fargo and supported
the transaction by infusing $25 billion of capital into Wells Fargo. Federal regulators forced
National City into a similar “shotgun marriage” with PNC, wh ich was assisted by a federal
infusion of $7.7 billion of capital into PNC.126 It was ironic – but almost certainly not
coincidental – that Wachovia and National City filed the lawsuits that ultimately led to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Watters, because both banks wanted to stop the states from
regulating their mortgage operating subsidiaries.127 The foregoing disasters occurred despite the
fact that the OCC maintained permanent teams of on-site examiners at each of the 17 largest
national banks. 128
On the OTS’ side of the regulatory ledger, two of the largest thrifts (Wamu and IndyMac)
failed after suffering devastating losses from reckless nonprime lending. Similar debacles
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occurred at AIG and three big W all Street firms, all of which owned thrifts and were sub ject to
oversight by the OT S. A IG was saved from bankruptcy by a huge federal bailout that grew to
$182.5 billion by March 2009. Lehman Brothers collapsed and filed for bankruptcy. To avoid a
similar fate, Bear Stearn s and Merrill Lynch entered into emergency, federally-assisted mergers
with JP Morgan Chase and BofA. The OTS received heavy criticism for its shortcomings in
regulating all six of the foregoing entities. The SEC was also at fault for failing to provide
effective supervision of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. 129
A recent study by Patricia McC oy, Andrey Pavlov and Susan Wachter analyzed
delinquency rates on residential mortgage loans made by four categories of depository institutions
between 2006 and 2008. The study found that loans made by federal thrifts had the highest
delinq uency rate and loans made by national banks had the second highest delinquency rate. In
contrast, state banks had the lowest mortgage delinquency rate and state thrifts had the second
lowest rate.1 3 0 In view of the substantially inferior lending performance of federally-chartered
depository institutions, the stud y’s authors rejected arguments by federal regulators that state
authorities bore most of the blame for the subprime lending crisis. Instead, the authors concluded
that the OC C, OTS an d FR B were guilty of more serious regulatory lapses:
After the magnitude of the subprim e debacle became know n, federal regulators
became adept at blaming the states for not regulating independent mortgage
lenders and brokers effectively. Certainly, some states regulated these actors
more heavily than others, and some states failed to regulate them at all. But the
attack on the states obscures two essential facts. First, by the end of 2005, the
majority of states had enacted compreh ensive law s of varying strengths to
address improvident subprime loans. Indeed, proactive states adopted their laws
years before the OCC, OTS, and the Federal Reserve Board took any meaningful
action. Second, through their preemption rules, the OC C and O TS blocked
enforcement of the most meaningful body of laws regulating reckless loan
products – the state mini-HOE PA laws – for federal savings associations,
national banks, and their mortgage lending subsidiaries. The Federal Reserve
Board meanwhile refused to exercise its authority under HOEPA to correct the
unlevel playing field by promulgating binding rules against unfair and deceptive
129
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acts and practices that [would have] applied to virtually all lenders nationwide.
As a result, meaningful regulation was non-existent at worst and ineffective at
best for lenders cloaked with federal preemption and for lenders in unregulated
states.131
As noted above, the briefs filed by NYAG Cuom o and supporting amici contained
extensive allegations that the OCC’s preemption rules and regulatory failings contributed to the
severity of the subprime financial crisis.132 It seems likely that the Suprem e Court’s decision in
Cuomo was influenced by those arguments. The comments made by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens
and Souter during the Cuomo oral argument provide suggestive evidence of that influence.
Unresolved Questions Concerning the Applicability of Chevron Deference to Preemption
Claims by Federal A gencies
Cuomo addressed , but did not resolve, two recurring questions concerning the appropriate
judicial treatment of preemptive rulings by federal agencies. First, should courts give Chevron
deference or a lower degree of deference to an agency regulation or order that includes a
declaration of preemption ? Second, should courts apply a presumption against preemption in
evaluating agency claims of authority to override state laws in areas that the states have
traditionally regulated?
Justice Stevens, who authored Chevron, addressed both of the foregoing questions in his
dissenting opinion in Watters and again in his majority opinion in Wyeth. In those opinions,
Justice Stevens indicated that Chevron deference should not be given to a federal agency’s
declaration of preemption unless Congress has made an explicit delegation of preemptive
rulemaking authority to the agency. In place of Chevron, Justice Stevens’ opinions provide the
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basis for a more demanding, four-part test to determine the appropriate degree of deference that
courts should apply in reviewing preemption claims by federal agencies. As part of that
framework, the presumption against preemption would require a federal agency to present
persuasive evidence showing that Congress intended to delegate authority permitting the agency
to issue preemp tive rules overriding state law in fields of traditional state regulation.
Justice Scalia took a significantly different approach to the question of judicial deference
in his majority opinion in Cuomo. Justice Scalia said that he was applying Chevron in reviewing
the validity of the OCC’s “visitorial powers” rule. However, he applied a much less deferential
version of Chevron than the approach advocated by Justice Thom as in his dissenting opinion.
After making a careful evaluation of the OC C’s claim of delegated authority, Justice Scalia
concluded that the OCC’s preemptive rule exceeded the limits of the OCC’s power under the
NB A. Thus, after Cuomo there is continuing uncertainty regarding the appropriate level of
judicial deference for agen cy preemption claims.
Justice Stevens’ Treatment of Chevron in Watters and Wyeth
In his dissenting opinion in Watters, Justice Stevens maintained that “the most pressing
questions in this case are whether Congress delegated to the [OCC] the authority to preempt the
laws of a sovereign State as they apply to operating subsidiaries [of national banks], and if so,
whether that authority was properly exercised here.” 133 Justice Stevens’ framing of those
questions in Watters was consistent with his opinion for the Court in Louisiana Pu blic Service
Comm’n v. FCC.134 In that case, the Court declared that “an agency literally has no pow er to act,
let alone . . . pre-emp t the validly en acted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until
Con gress confers pow er upon it.” 135
In Watters, Justice Stevens argued that Chevron did not provide the appropriate
framework for reviewing the OCC’s preemp tive regulation. In his view, “when an agency
133
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purports to decide the scope of federal preemption, a healthy respect for state sovereignty calls for
something less than Chevron deference.” 136 He concluded that an agency’s views on preemption
should be entitled to “some weight” but only to the extent that the agency provided an “expert”
opinion about the ways in which state law conflicted with the federal statutory scheme. 137
In addition, Justice Stevens maintained that the Court should have applied a presumption
against preemption in Watters, because the state mortgage lending laws in question were
“designed to protect consumers” and “[c]onsumer protection is quintessentially ‘a field which the
States have traditionally occupied.’”138 Based on that presumption, Justice Stevens contended
that the OC C’s preemptive regulation should have been struck down in the absence of any “clear
and manifest purpose of Congress” to preempt the states’ authority to regulate state-chartered
operating subsidiaries of national banks.139
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Watters carefully avoided the issue of Chevron
deference and instead based its finding of preemption solely on the statutory provisions of the
NB A. Justice Ginsburg declared that “the level of deference owed to the [O CC ’s] regulation is
an academic question,” because “the NBA itself – independent of the OCC’s regulation –
136
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preempts the application of the pertinent Michigan laws to national bank operating
subsidiaries.” 140 She maintained that any argument concern ing the propriety of Chevron
deference “is beside the point” because the OCC ’s regulation “merely clarifies and confirms what
the NBA already conveys.” 141
In his majority opinion in Wyeth, Justice Stevens returned to the question of whether a
federal agency’s claim of preemption should receive Chevron deference. Once again, he
indicated that Chevron does not provide the appropriate framework for reviewing agency
assertions of preemption, except in situations where Congress has explicitly granted preemptive
rulemaking authority to an agency. In that context, Justice Stevens declared that “agencies have
no special authority to pronounce on preemp tion absent delegation by Congress.” 142
Justice Stevens explained in Wyeth that the Supreme Court had previously reviewed
agency claims of preemption by “perform[ing] its own conflict determination, relying on the
substance of state and federal law and not on agency proclamations of pre-emption.” 143 In such
cases, Justice Stevens emph asized that “we have not deferred to the agency’s conclusion that state
law is pre-empted.” Instead, “we have given ‘some weight’ to an agency’s views . . . . about how
state requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’”144 In Justice Stevens’ view, “[t]he weight we accord to the agency’s
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explanation of state law ’s im pact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency,
and persuasiveness.” 145
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Wyeth did not define the precise degree of “weight”
that courts should give to agency claims of preemption. However, his citation to Skidmore and
his reference to the Skidmore factors of “thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness”
indicated that agency preemptive determinations should receive the relatively low level of
deference described in Skidmore.146 In addition, Justice Stevens maintained in Wyeth that a
presumption against preemption should apply “[i]n all preemption cases, and particularly those in
which Congress has ‘legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.’”147 As he
had previously indicated in his dissent in Watters, Justice Stevens did not believe that the
presumption against preemption should be set aside simply because a federal agency had issued a
finding of preemption.
In Wyeth, the Food and Drug A dministration (“FDA ”) declared in a preamble to a final
regulation that tort claims under state law were preempted by federal statutes regulating the
labeling of prescription drugs. For two reasons, the Supreme Court refused to give any deference
to the FD A’s preemption claim. First, w hen the FDA issued the proposed regulation for public
comment, the FD A said that the regulation would not preempt state law. T he FDA did not notify
the public of any change in its position until the agency published its final rule. At that point, the
FDA suddenly inserted a declaration of preemption into the preamble without any advance notice
or any opportunity for public comment on the preemption issue. The Court concluded that the
FD A’s preem ption claim was “inherently suspect in light of this procedural failure.” 148
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Id. (citing Un ited States v. M ead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001), and Skidmo re v. Sw ift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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Id.; see also Skidm ore, 323 U .S. at 140 (stating that “[t]he weight of [the agency’s] judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control”).
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Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (quo ting Metronic v. Lohr. 518 U.S. 470 , 485 (1996 ) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S.
at 230)).
148
Id. at 1201.
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Second , the C ourt determined that the FDA’s assertion of preemption “is at odds with
what evidence we have of Congress’ purposes, and it reverses the FDA’s own longstanding
position [of non-preemption] without providing a reasoned explanation, including any discussion
of how state [tort] law has interfered with the FDA ’s regulation of drug labeling during decades
of coexistence.” 149 In view of the fact that “C ongress has repeatedly declin ed to pre-empt state
[tort] law” with respect to prescription drugs, the Court held that the FDA’s claim of preemption
was “entitled to no weight.” 150
Justice Stevens’ Four-Part Framework for Determining the Appropriate Level of
Judicial Deference for A gency Preem ption C laims
Justice Stevens did not articulate a precise formula for reviewing agency assertions of
preemptive authority in his dissenting opinion in Watters or his majority opinion in Wyeth.
However, a four-part framework for determining the appropriate level of judicial deference for
agency preemption claims can be derived from those op inions. A s explained b elow, that fourpart test would strike an appropriate balance between (i) the granting of some deference to the
specialized expertise of adm inistrative agencies and (ii) the judiciary’s responsibility to ensure
that preemption issues are resolved in accordance with constitutional and statutory limits on
federal power.
First, Chevron deference is inapplicable absent an explicit delegation of preemptive
rulemaking authority to the agency. In his opinions in Watters and Wyeth, Justice Stevens
indicated that a federal agency’s preemptive regulation should not receive Chevron deference
unless Congress has expressly granted preemptive rulemakin g power to the agency.151 This
149

Id. The three dissenters in Wyeth did not contend that the FDA’s preemption claim should receive
Chevron deference. Instead, they argued that the FDA’s position was entitled to “some weight” under
Geier and should have been upheld. They also contended that it was irrelevant that the FDA’s preemption
claim was not adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking or that it represented a change in the
agency’s position. Id. at 1227-29 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1201-04 (quo tes at 1204).
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Wa tters, 550 U.S. at 38-3 9, 41 (Steve ns, J., dissenting); see also Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1 201 & n.9 .
Justice Stevens emphasized in Watters that Congress had not made an explicit grant of preemptive
rulemaking authority to the OCC. He described the O CC’s rulemaking powers under 12 U .S.C. §§ 93a and
371 (a) as “generic authorizations of rulem aking authority . . . and neithe r says a word about pree mptio n. . . .
Needless to say, they provide no textual foundation for the OCC’s assertion of preemption authority.”
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requirement would ensure that a federal agency cannot appeal to Chevron unless its preemption
claim is based on an explicit statutory grant of preemptive authority rather than merely the
agency’s “interpretation” of an ambiguous statute. As Justice Stevens explained in Watters,
granting Chevron deference to preemptive agency rulings based on ambiguous statutes would
grant federal agencies a far-reaching power to override state law, except in those rare situations
where Congress has unambiguously barred an agency from acting.152
The opinions of the Second Circuit and Justice Thomas in Cuomo reveal the inadequacy
of highly deferential review in the context of agency preemption. The Second Circuit stated that
“[a]lthough the precise scope of ‘visitorial’ powers is not entirely clear from the text of [12
U.S.C.] § 484(a), . . . we cannot agree . . . that the statute clearly precludes the interpretation the
OC C has adopted.” 153 Similarly, Justice Thomas argued in his dissenting opinion in Cuomo that,
und er Chevron, the Court was required to “decide only whether the construction adopted by the
[OC C] is un ambiguously foreclosed by the statute’s text.”154 As a practical matter, the approach
followed by the Second Circuit and Justice Thomas in Cuomo would have created a virtually
conclusive presumption in favor of the OC C’s authority to preempt the states’ sovereign law
enforcement powers, even though the OC C was relying on an admittedly ambiguous statute.155

Wa tters, 550 U.S. at 39 & nn.22 -23 (S tevens, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 41 (“No case from this Court has ever applied such a deferential standard to an agency decision
that could so easily disrupt the federal-state balance. . . . [W]ith relative ease [federal agencies] can
promulgate comprehensive and detailed regulations that have broad preemption ramifications for state law.
. . . For that reason, when an agency purports to decide the scope of federal preemption, a healthy respect
for state sovereignty calls for something less than Chevron deference.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted ); see also id. at 39 & n. 23 (maintaining that Congress had not delegated any preemptive
rulemaking authority to the OCC).
153
Cuomo, 510 F.3d at 117.
154
Cuom o, 129 S. Ct. at 2733 (T homas, J., dissenting in part).
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As previously noted, both the majority and dissenting opinions in Cuomo determined that the term
“visitorial powers” in 12 U.S.C. § 484 contained at least “some ambiguity” with respect to the question of
whether § 4 84 b arred judicial enforcement actio ns by state officials against natio nal banks. See supra note
17 and accompanying text. Prior to Cuomo, the Suprem e Court affirmed the sovereign nature of the states’
law enforcement powers in several cases, including Caldero n v. Thom pson, 523 U .S. 538, 556 (199 8);
Dia mo nd v. Cha rles, 476 U.S. 54, 6 5 (1986 ); Heath v. Alab am a, 474 U.S. 82, 89, 93 (1985); and Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 , 137 (1959 ). In his dissent from the Second C ircuit’s decision in Cuomo, Judge
Cardam one argued that “[i]t is d ifficult to imag ine a more core aspect of state sovereignty than the authority
to pass and enforce valid nonpreempted state laws.” Cuomo, 510 F.3d at 131 (Cardamon e, J., dissenting).
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In Gregory v. Ashcroft,156 the Supreme Court declared that the power of Congress to
adopt legislation preempting “areas traditionally regulated by the States . . . is an ex traordinary
power in a federalist system. It is a power that we must assume C ongress does not exercise
lightly.” 157 The Court therefore held that Congress must “make its intention ‘clear and manifest’
if intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.” 158
Because Gregory involved a claim of statutory rather than regulatory preemption,
Gregory did not con sider the issue of whether courts should apply Chevron in reviewing agency
preem ptive rulings. However, Gregory’s reasoning strongly sup ports the view th at Chevron
should not apply when a federal agency’s claim of preemptive authority rests on an ambiguous
statute. Gregory held that the courts may not conclude that a statute alters “the state-federal
balance” in the absence of a “plain statement” of Congress’ intent to change that balance. The
Court explained that this “plain statement rule” helps to ensure that “the political process” has
given appropriate consideration to the states’ interest in being protected “against intrusive
exercises of Congress’ Com merce Clause pow ers.” 159 In addition, as the Court observed, to “give
the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congression al am biguity would evade the very
procedure for lawmaking on which Ga rcia relied to protect states’ interests.” 160
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501 U .S. 452 (1991 ).
Id.at 460.
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Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 , 230 (1947 )).
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Id. at 460-61 , 464 -67 (q uotes at 461, 46 4).
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Id. at 464 (quoting Laure nce H . Trib e, American Constitutional Law § 6-25 at 480 (Mineola, NY:
Foundation Press, 2d ed. 198 8), and citing Ga rcia v. S an A nton io M etrop olitan Tran sit Auth ., 469 U.S. 528
(1985)). Thus, Gregory reflects the Supreme Court’s view that “a clear statement requirement is necessary
in order to ensure compliance with federal lawmaking procedures and to protect the residual authority of
the states under the Supremacy Clause.” Bradford R. Clark, “Process-Based Preemption,” in William W.
Buzbee, ed., Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question
(Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press 2009), at 191, 204. Professor Clark has explained that the
Supremacy Clause (the constitutional source of the preemption doctrine) and other provisions of the
Constitution are “carefully structured to restrict both who may exercise lawmaking power on behalf of the
United States (acto rs subject to the political safeguards of federalism) and how they may exercise it (only in
acco rdance with p recise p rocedures that req uire the p articipa tion and assent of the states or the ir
representatives in the Senate).” Id. at 195-97 (quote at 197). Accordingly, “[i]f judges permit an
ambiguous provision of a federal statute to preempt state law, they risk circumventing federal lawmaking
procedures and the political safeguards [of federalism] they incorporate.” Id. at 204-05.
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Granting Chevron deference to preemptive agency rulings based on ambiguous statutes
would clearly undermine the federalism-based canons articulated in Gregory. Gregory bars
courts from relying on ambiguous statutes to infer a congressional intent to preempt traditional
state functions. Similarly, courts should not allow a federal agency to infer a preemptive
congressional purpose based solely on the agency’s “interpretation” of a statute that is silent or
ambiguous with regard to any such purpose.
To preserve our federal structure, Gregory’s ban on judicial inference of preemptive
intent from ambigu ous statutes should apply with at least equal force wh en federal agencies claim
to speak for Congress in asserting preemption based on statutory ambiguity. Unlike Congress,
federal agencies are less vulnerable to discipline from “the political process” and do not provide
the states with any constitutionally-guaranteed structure of representation that would promote a
vigorous and thorough discussion of the states’ interests and concerns before a preemptive
regulation is adopted. Justice Stevens declared in Watters that federal agencies should not
receive Chevron deference wh en they issue preemptive rulings because such agencies “are clearly
not designed to represen t the interests of States.” 161 For similar reasons, Nina M endelson
contends that courts should not defer to an agency’s assertion of preemptive authority over an
area in which Congress has not clearly expressed its intent to displace state law:
[R]equiring a showing that Congress clearly wishes to preempt state law . . . gives some
protection to state regulatory autonomy. . . . [A] presumption [against preemption] also
helps assure that legislative decisions to preempt are thoughtful and deliberate rather than
simply ‘incidental.’ . . .
....
Although state institutions have the opportunity to comment on rulemaking through the
notice-and comment process, those comm ents are likely to be lower-visibility, both to
161

Wa tters, 550 U .S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 883 (Steve ns, J.,
dissenting)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, “Nondelegation Canons,” 67 University of Chicago Law Review
315, 331 (2000) (explaining that “the idea that administrative agencies will not be allowed to interpret
ambiguous [statutory] provisions so as to preempt state law . . . [is] an important requirement in light of the
various safeguards against cavalier disregard of state interests created by the system of state representation
in Congress”); Clark, supra note 160, at 213 (agreeing with Professor Sunstein’s suggestion that “the
preemption decision must be made legislatively, not bureaucratically” in view of the “constitutional
com mitment to a fed eral struc ture”) (quo ting Sunstein, supra, at 331).
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decisionmakers and to the public, than objections raised by a member of Congress to a
legislative prop osal. . . .
[A]gencies, unlike Congress and the courts, are specialized institutions that are not set up
to consider state autonomy concerns. 162
Professor Mendelson and Thomas M errill con tend that federal agencies are sub ject to
additional institutional limitations (including a tendency toward “empire building” and a bias
against allowing regulatory “competition” from the states) that undermine the agencies’ ability to
resolve preemption issues in a m anner that gives appropriate weight to the interests of state
autonomy within our federal system.163 After considering similar factors based on institutional
competence and motivation, Professor Merrill concludes that courts are better suited to resolve
preemption issues that arise out of ambiguous federal statutes. Accordingly, he contends that
courts should not give Chevron deference to agency preemption claims based on statutory
ambiguity:
[A]lthough preemption entails the resolution of policy disputes, those disputes have
significant dimensions along which courts are likely to perform better than agencies –
dimensions such as preserving fidelity to the Constitution’s division of powers, the need
for preserving stability in that division, the desirability of preserving an overall balance
between federal and state authority, and the need to discern accurately the nature and
content of state law alleged to be in tension with federal law.164

162

Nina A. Mendelson, “A Presumption Against Agency Preemption,” 102 Northwestern Law Review 695,
710, 717 (2008).
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Id. at 717-22; Thomas W. Merrill, “Preemption and Institutional Choice,” 102 Northwestern Law
Review 727, 755-57, 772-73 (2008) (quotes at 756). In contrast, Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld contend,
based on a “realist approach to administrative law” and a “functional analysis of . . . the relative
institutional competen ce of the three b ranches” of federal government, that “age ncies are in ma ny contexts
better suited to consider federalism concerns than are Congress or the federal judiciary.” Brian Galle &
Mark Seidenfeld, “Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
Federal Power,” 57 Duke Law R eview 193 3, 19 38-3 9, 19 48-4 9 (2008 ). Pro fessors Galle and Seidenfeld
explain that their “functional” analysis is directed at “improving the regulatory process, not the preservation
of state regulatory prerogatives per se.” Id. at 1949. T hus, their “realist approach” does not see k to justify
or defend any “formalistic preference for protection of dual sovereignty.” Id. at 1938, 1949.
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Merrill, supra note 163, at 772; see also id. at 757-59 (concluding that, “[t]aking all these factors into
consideration, . . . courts should continue to function as the institution that has the last wo rd on whether to
displace state law through preemption,” id. at 759). In contrast, Professors Galle and Seidenfeld maintain
that “any d octrina l trend to ward requiring in all cases clear congressio nal authorization for [agency]
preemptio n . . . is mistaken .” Ga lle & Seiden feld, supra note 163, at 1940. They conclude, based on
institutional considerations of “accountability, transparency, and deliberativeness,” that “federal agencies
should often be the preferred institutions in which to vest the authority to allocate power between the states
and federal government.” Id. at 1948, 1936.
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Second, no deference should be given to agency interpretations of statutes, judicial
precedents and other legal authorities that do not require specialized agency expertise. Justice
Stevens’ opinion in Wyeth supports the view that courts should not defer to an agency’s legal
conclusions about preemption based on the agency’s interpretations of statutes, Supreme C ourt
precedents or other legal authorities that do not require the agency to apply its specialized
expertise.165 Moreover, in a 2004 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Suprem e Court held
that “’pure question[s] of statutory construction . . . well within the province of the Judiciary . . .
merit no special deference,” and the Court further explained that an agency’s “views on questions
within its area of expertise merit greater deference than its opinions regarding the scope of a
congressional en actment.” 166 Similarly, the Court recently declared that “[a]gencies have no
special claim to deference in their interpretation of our decisions.” 167
Third, “some weight” may be given to an agency’s expert analysis of the ways in which
state law s conflict with the statutory scheme adm inistered by the agency, but courts should
carefully scrutinize agency claims of “obstacle” preemption. Justice Stevens’ opinion in Wyeth
indicates that courts should give “some weight” to an agency’s analysis of alleged conflicts
between state laws and the governing federal statute, provided the agency’s analysis is based on
matters within the agency’s special expertise and otherwise has “power to persuade” under
Skidmore. Thus, courts should consider evidence showing that the agency has made “informed
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Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200-01.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U .S. 677, 7 01, 70 2 n.23 (2 004) (opinion for the C ourt by Steven s,
J.) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 , 466, 468 (19 87) (same). Similarly, in Cuomo the
Second Circuit found it “troublesome” that the “administrative record [supporting the OCC’s claim of
exclusive enforcement powers over national banks] consists almost entirely of the agency’s interpretations
of case law, legislative history, and statutory text. . . . These are not subjects on which the OCC holds any
special expertise.” Cuomo, 510 F.3d at 118. The Second Circuit also observed that “the OCC does not
appear to have found any facts at all in promulgating its visitorial powers regulation. It accretes a great deal
of regulatory authority to itself at the expense of the states through rulemaking lacking any real intellectual
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determinations about how state requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”168
Even here, Professor Mendelson warns that courts should closely scrutinize an agency’s
claim that state law presents an “obstacle” to th e accom plishm ent of congressional purposes. In
her view, courts should carefully evaluate the content and strength of legislative policies inherent
in federal statu tes and should determine wh ether state law s actually create significant conflicts
with those policies. Otherwise, “federal agencies would have the power to preempt nearly any
state law . . . as long as the agency can explain how the state law strikes a different balance of
statutory objectives than the federal [agency’s] approach d oes.” 169
Similarly, William Buzbee contends that federal agency claims of “obstacle” preemption
should be subject to “hard look review,” including (i) “close scrutiny of agency factual and policy
conclusions,” and (ii) a careful evaluation of the agency’s decisionmaking process to ensure that
the “agency engaged the views of affected stakehold ers, considered underlying facts or data in
dispute, and addressed them in a reasonable way.” 170 Professor Buzbee notes that agency claims
of conflict preemption frequently turn on the agency’s “assertions about benefits and harms of
allowing multiple [state and federal] regulatory voices or displacing all but a single, federal
regulatory actor.” 171 Unless courts engage in “hard look” review that insists upon an “open and
deliberative agency process,” he fears that federal agencies will often discount or ignore the
benefits of preserving a federalist system with multiple regulators. In this regard, he believes that
overlapping federal-state regulatory systems “improve the odds of superior regulatory outcomes”
by (i) reducing the risk of policy mistakes by a single, all-powerfu l regulator whose decisions are
difficult to challenge or correct, (ii) increasing “opportunities for mutual adjustment and learning”
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Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
Mendelson, supra note 162, at 714.
170
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by multiple regulators with concurrent jurisdictions, and (iii) preserving the “states as laboratories
of [experimentation and] democracy.” 172
Fourth, a presum ption against preemption applies whenever an agency seeks to preempt a
traditional state function. Justice Stevens’ opinion in Wyeth indicates that courts should not defer
to an agency’s preemp tion claim under Skidmore unless the agency’s case for preemption is
sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption that C ongress does not intend to preempt state
law in areas of traditional state regulation. In Wyeth, Justice Stevens rejected the FD A’s claim
that state tort suits presented an “obstacle” to congressional objectives regarding the labeling of
prescription drugs. Justice Stevens noted that Congress ad opted an express preemption statute
covering medical devices in 1976 but failed to do so with respect to prescription drugs. In view
of the presumption against preemption of state laws in the field of consumer protection, Justice
Stevens determined that the “silence [of Congress] on the issue, coupled with its certain
awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not
intend FD A oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness” 173
Four justices joined Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Wyeth. 1 7 4 However, it is
debatable whether a majority of the Cou rt fully supported Ju stice Stevens’ suggested framew ork
for judicial deference. In addition to joining the majority opinion in Wyeth, Justice Breyer filed a
concurring opinion indicating that he might have given the FDA ’s preemption claim greater
deference if it had been adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 175 Justice Thom as did
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Id. at 1576-78.
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1 194 -95, 1 200 (quo te). Pro fessor B uzbee agrees that courts should apply a
presu mptio n against preemptio n when they rev iew age ncy claim s of pre emp tive autho rity. As he p oints
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against preemption.” Id. at 1564.
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The group o f Justices joining the majority opinion in Wyeth was the same as in Cuomo, except that
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in Wyeth but not in Cuomo, while Justice Scalia took the
opposite position in bo th cases.
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Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204 (B reyer, J., concurring).
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not join the majority opinion in Wyeth and instead filed an opinion concurring only in the
judgment. 176
The Application of Chevron in C uo m o and the Relevance of Gon zales and Brand X
As previously noted, Justice Scalia cited Wyeth with approval in his majority opinion in
Cuomo.177 However, Justice Scalia did not adopt the analytical approach for reviewing agency
preemption claims that Justice Stevens suggested in Wyeth. Justice Scalia instead explained that
he was applying “the familiar Chevron framew ork.” 178 Even so, Justice Scalia’s application of
Chevron gave little deference to the OCC and instead carefully scrutinized the OCC ’s claim of
preemptive authority.
Cuomo and Gonzales v. Oregon: With regard to the first step of Chevron – determining
whether “the intent of C ongress is clear” 179 – Justice Scalia declared that the existence of “some
ambiguity” in 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) “does not expand Chevron deference to cover virtually any
interpretation of the [NBA ].” 180 Justice Scalia’s refusal in Cuomo to gran t Chevron deference,
based simply on statutory ambiguity, was similar to the Supreme Court’s approach in Gonzales v.
Oregon.181 In Gonzales, the C ourt held that “Chevron deference . . . is not accorded merely
because the statute is ambigu ous and an administrative official is involved. [R ather,] the rule
must be promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the official.”182
Additionally, the Court warned in Gonzales that if an agency claims “broad and unusual authority
176

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas contended that the FDA’s preemption
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with the OCC’s preemptive rule in Cuomo because the OCC relied on a statute – 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) – that
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authority to the O CC. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2722-23, 2732 -33 (Thom as, J., dissenting in part).
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Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718.
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Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
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Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715.
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546 U .S. 243 (2006 ).
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through an implicit delegation” based on “vague terms” in the governing statute, the Court may
well conclude that “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.” 183
In Gonzales, the US Attorney General issued an interpretive rule barring doctors from
prescribin g dru gs to be used in assisted suicid es. The A ttorney General’s rule specifically
preem pted any state law au thorizing state-licensed physicians to prescribe drugs for that purpose.
The Supreme Court struck down the rule because (i) the Attorney General’s claim of preemptive
authority would “effect a radical shift of authority from the States to the Federal Government to
define general standards of medical practice in every locality,” and (ii) the “text and structure of
the [governing federal statute] show that Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the
federal-state balance.” 184 Justice Scalia’s refusal in Cuomo to give the O CC wide leeway in
inferring preemptive authority from statutory ambiguity was consistent with the limitations on
Chevron deference expressed in Gonzales.
With regard to the second step of Chevron – determining whether the OCC made a
“reasonable interpretation” of the NBA 185 – Justice Scalia concluded in Cuomo that historical
evidence and judicial precedents enabled the Court (i) to “discern the outer limits” of § 484(a)
and (ii) to determine that the OC C exceeded its authority in defining “visitorial powers” to
include “ordinary enforcement of the law .” 186 As previously discussed, Justice Scalia held that
applicable federal statutes did not contemplate the “bizarre” result produced by the OC C’s
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regulation – namely, a preemptive bar that would override “traditional state powers” to enforce
valid state laws against national banks through judicial proceedings. 187
Justice Scalia’s careful analysis of whether Congress affirmatively delegated the
preemptive authority claimed by the O CC could be view ed as supporting either of two possible
approaches to the application of Chevron in similar agency preemption cases. Each of those
approaches would strengthen judicial scrutiny of preemptive agency rulings under Chevron. The
first possibility is that the question of whether the agency has received an adequate delegation of
statutory preemptive authority should be made at “step zero,” before a reviewing court even
begins to apply the two-step Chevron analysis.188
The second possibility is that a reviewing court should examine the question of
congressionally delegated authority at “step 2.1” of the Chevron analysis. Under this approach , if
a reviewing court finds at “step one” that the agency has based its preemptive ruling on an
ambiguous statute, the court should then decide at the beginning of “step two” wh ether Congress
has affirmatively delegated preem ptive authority to the agency, before the court proceeds to
determine whether the agency has made a “reasonable” interpretation of the ambiguous statute.
Thus, under a “step 2.1” approach,
the court must carefully consider whether Congress has authorized the agency to adopt a
preemptive regulation to clarify the ambiguity or to fill the “gap” that the agency has
identified in the governing statute.
Only if the court answers “yes” at “step 2.1” may the court then proceed to a
more deferential analysis of whether the agency has made a “reasonable” interpretation of
the statute. . . . [I]f the agency adopts an “interpretation” of a statute that . . . encroaches
upon an area traditionally regulated by the states, the reviewing court should require a
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clear showing that the agency’s “interpretation” is consistent with the available evidence
of Congress’ intent.189
Gonzales and Cuomo followed an analytical approach that could be viewed as fitting
within the “step 2.1” formulation. In each case, the Court first determined that there was some
degree of ambiguity in the governing federal statute.190 In each case, the Court proceeded to
make a careful analysis of whether the federal agency’s preem ptive ruling was supported by a
sufficient congressional delegation of preemptive authority. Finding that the available evidence
of congressional intent did not support such a delegation, the Court concluded in each case that
the agency’s preemptive ruling was invalid and not entitled to deference.191
In Gonzales, the Court shifted from a Chevron analysis to the less deferential standard of
Skidmore after the Court concluded that the challenged ruling “was not prom ulgated pursuant to
the Attorney General’s [statutory] authority.”192 In Cuomo, the C ourt did not m ake an explicit
shift from Chevron to Skidmore. However, Justice Scalia closely scrutinized the OCC ’s claims of
authority in a manner that suggested a less deferential, Skidmore type of inquiry.
In my view, the four-part framework for jud icial deference derived from Justice Stevens’
opinions in Watters and Wyeth would provide a superior methodology for analyzing agency
preemption claims based on ambiguous statutes. By completely avoiding the Chevron mode of
analysis, the four-part framework would encourage reviewing courts to perform an independent
and thorough consideration of the federalism-related factors discussed in Gregory. If, however,
the Supreme Cou rt ultimately decides to choose Chevron as the governing standard for evaluating
preemptive agency rulings, the Court should make clear – as it indicated in Gonzales and Cuomo
– that preemptive rulings are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny on the issue of whether
Congress has affirmatively delegated the preemptive authority asserted by the agency. Such
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enhanced scrutiny could be applied in accordance with either of the “step zero” or “step 2.1”
approaches discussed above.
In contrast to Justice Scalia’s searching analysis of the OCC ’s delegated authority in
Cuomo, Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion illustrates the pitfalls of applying a highly deferential
version of Chevron in a case where the agency’s preemptive ruling is based on an ambiguous
statute. Justice Thomas maintained that the OCC was entitled to Chevron deference because the
agency had “selected a permissible construction of a statutory term that was susceptible to
multiple interpretation s.” 193 In addition, as previously noted , he argued that under Chevron “[t]he
Court must decide only whether the construction adopted by the agency is unambigu ously
foreclosed by the statute’s text.” 194
As a practical matter, Justice Thom as’ imp lementation of Chevron would create a nearly
uncontestable presumption in favor of an agency’s authority to adopt preemptive interpretations
of ambigu ous statutes. In most cases, the very existence of statutory ambigu ity would make it
almost impossible for the states to show that Congress had “unambiguously foreclosed” the
agency’s preemptive ruling. As a federal appellate court explained in a comparable preemption
case, such an application of Chevron would be “flatly unfaithful to the principles of
administrative law” because “if we were to presume a delegation of power from the absence of an
express withholding of such power, agencies would en joy virtually limitless hegemony.” 195
Accordingly, the heightened scrutiny applied by the Court in Gonzales and Cuomo should
become the governing approach if the Court ultimately selects Chevron as the applicable standard
for judicial review of agency preemption claims.
Cuomo and Brand X: Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas also sharply differed in Cuomo
as to the binding impact of prior Supreme C ourt decisions on federal agencies under Chevron.
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Relying on National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,196 Justice
Thomas contended that the O CC was free under Chevron to adopt its own interpretation of
“visitorial powers” and to disregard St. Louis and several other Supreme Court decisions that had
previously upheld the authority of state officials to file lawsuits against national banks. Justice
Thomas maintained that Brand X made those earlier decisions irrelevant because they did not
adopt an “authoritative” construction of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) that explicitly preserved the states’
power of judicial enforcement as an exception to the limitation on “visitorial powers” under
§484(a). Justice Thomas concluded that none of the cited decisions “addressed the meaning of
‘visitorial powers’ for purposes of § 484(a), let alone provided a definitive construction of the
statute.” 197 In his view, “[i]f the Chevron doctrine is to have any interpretive value, an agency’s
construction of a statute cannot be foreclosed by a p rior d ecision in which the [statutory]
provision in question was neither raised by the parties nor passed upon by the court.”198
Justice Scalia rejected Justice Thomas’ argument based on Brand X. In Justice Scalia’s
view, “St. Louis is relevant to the proper interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) . . . because it is one
in a long and unbroken line of cases distinguishing visitation from law enforcement.”199
Alth ough Ju stice Scalia did not con test the point, it appears that Justice Thom as was mistaken in
concluding that the federal statutory limitation on “visitorial powers” was not invoked by the
litigants in St. Louis. The summaries of arguments presented by counsel in St. Louis, as
published in Un ited States Reports, indicate that both the national bank and the United States as
amici curiae argued that M issouri’s quo warranto action against the national bank was a violation
of the N BA ’s limitation on the exercise of “visitorial pow ers.” 200 Thus, St. Louis could
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reasonably be viewed as adopting, by necessary implication, a position that Section 484’s
limitation on “visitorial powers” did not preempt the states’ authority to enforce valid, nonpreempted state laws by filing lawsuits against national banks.
The debate in Cuomo between Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia over the binding effect
of St. Louis was effectively a replay of their dueling opinions in Brand X. Justice Thom as wrote
the majority opinion in Brand X while Justice Scalia authored a vigorous dissent. Justice
Thomas’ majority opinion held that “[b]efore a judicial construction of a statute . . . may trump an
agency’s [interpretation], the court must hold that the statute unambiguously requires the court’s
construction.” 201 In his dissent, Ju stice Scalia declared that Brand X’s concept of “judicial
decisions subject to reversal by executive officers” was “bizarre” and “probably unconstitutional”
as a violation of separation of powers. 202 In Justice Scalia’s view, “Article III courts do not sit to
render decisions that can be reversed or ignored by executive officers.” 203
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Brand X was consistent with his subsequent refusal in Cuomo
to allow the OCC to disregard St. Louis and other Suprem e Court decisions that had previously
uph eld the righ t of state officials to file lawsuits to enforce state law s against national banks.
While the majority opinion in Cuomo did not expressly overrule or limit Brand X, the two
opinions cannot easily be reconciled except on the ground that the agency in Brand X overruled
the decision of a court of appeals while the agency in Cuomo disregarded a Supreme C ourt
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preced ent. It therefore rem ains to be seen w hether Cuomo will be interpreted in the future as
barring federal agencies from adop ting interpretations of “ambigu ous” statutes that conflict with
previous Supreme C ourt (as opposed to appellate court) decisions.204
The Presumption against Preemption and the Doubtful Relevance of Locke and
Sm iley
An other recurring issue in agency preemption cases is w hether an agency’s claim to
judicial deference under Chevron must overcome a presumption against preemption. As
discussed above, Justice Stevens strongly endorsed the applicability of a presumption against
preemption in both his dissenting opinion in Watters and his majority opinion in Wyeth.205
In Cuomo, Justice Scalia found it “un necessary” to invoke a presumption against
preemption in order to strike down the OCC’s regulation.206 However, he emphasized that “the
incursion that the [OCC’s] regulation makes upon traditional state powers [should not] be
minimized.” 207 He pointed out that “the [OCC] was not given authority to enforce nonpre-empted
state law s [against national banks] until 1966,” and he therefore rejected Justice Thom as’ claim
that the “historic police powers of the States” were unaffected by the OCC’s regulation.208
Similarly, in Gonzales the Supreme Court found it “unnecessary even to consider the
application of . . . presumptions against pre-emption” in concluding that Congress “[did] not
authorize the Attorney General to bar dispensing controlled substances for assisted suicide in the
face of a state medical regim e perm itting such conduct.” 209 The Cou rt rejected the Attorney
General’s claim that the governing federal statue “impliedly authorizes . . . an expansive federal
authority to regulate medicine,” in view of the statute’s “silence on the practice of medicine
204
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generally and its recognition of state regulation of the medical profession.” 210 Thus, in both
Cuomo and Gonzales, the Court recognized the potential applicability of a presumption against
preemption in determining whether to defer to a federal agency’s preemptive ruling under
Chevron. However, the Court did not consider it necessary in either case to invoke the
presumption, because the evidence of congressional intent was sufficiently persuasive on its own
to defeat the agency’s claim of preemptive authority.
The Inapp licability of Locke to Fields of Dual Federal-State Regulation: In his dissenting
opinion in Cuomo, Justice Thomas contended, based on United States v. Locke,211 that a
presumption against preemption should never be applied in construing the preemptive effect of
the NBA.212 However, Justice Thomas’ reliance on Locke was misplaced. In Locke the Supreme
Court struck down state laws that imposed requirements and restrictions on oil tankers operating
in navigable w aterways. The C ourt refused to apply “an ‘assumption’ of “nonp re-emption ” in
Locke with respect to the field of “national and international maritime commerce,” because
“Congress has legislated in the field from the earliest days of the Republic” and has consistently
expressed its desire to establish a “uniformity of regulation for maritime com merce.” 213 Thus,
Locke involved a field of com merce in which the federal government exercised near-monolithic
control and left little room for state involvement. In contrast, the Court held in Atherton that
federal policy did not require any “uniformity” of treatment for federally-chartered banks, in view
of the long history of supplem ental state regulation of national banks. A ccordingly, Atherton
refused to adopt a federal common-law rule for federally-chartered banks that would override
state-law stand ards governing fiduciary duties of bank directors .214
210
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Congress expressed its strong support for the continuing application of state laws to
national banks when it passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994, 108 S tat. 2338 (Riegle-Neal Act). The Riegle-Neal Act requires interstate branches of
national banks to comply with host state law s in four broadly-defined areas – community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending and intrastate branching – unless such laws
discriminate against national banks or are otherwise preemp ted by federal law. 12 U.S.C. §
36(f)(1)(A). In explaining why state laws should generally apply to national banks, the
conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act declared:
States have a strong interest in the activities and operations of depository
institutions doing business within their jurisdictions, regardless of the type of the charter
an institution holds. In particular, States have a legitimate interest in protecting the rights
of their consumers, businesses an d com munities. . . .
Under well-established judicial principles, national banks are subject to State law
in many significant respects. . . . Courts generally use a rule of construction that avoids
finding a conflict between the Federal and State law where possible. The [Riegle-Neal
Act] does not change these judicially established principles. 215
The Riegle-Neal conference report thus endorsed a judicial “rule of construction” that
closely resembles a presumption against preemption. The Riegle-Neal conference report – read
in context with Atherton and previous Supreme Court decisions (including St. Louis, Lewis and
Luckett) – demonstrates that Congress has preserved a significant, supplemental role for the
states in regulating national banks. The history of dual federal-state regulation of national banks
stands in sharp contrast to Congress’ preclusion of any substantial role for the states in regulating
maritime commerce. Accordingly, the reasoning in Locke is clearly inapplicable to preemption
cases arising under the NBA.216
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Similarly, in Wyeth Justice Stevens rejected the argument that “the presumption against
pre-emption should not apply to this case because the Federal Government has regulated drug
labeling for more than a century.”217 Justice Stevens exp lained that “the presum ption [against
preemption] accounts for the historic presence of state law” in a particular field and “does not rely
on the absence of federal regulation.” He further maintained that a presumption against
preemption was warranted in Wyeth because “Congress has indicated its awareness of the
operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has n onetheless decided to stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] betw een them.” 218 Thus, Wyeth confirms that
Locke does not apply to a field of activity with a strong tradition of concurrent state regulation,
even if the federal government has a major presence or even the predominant role in regulating
that field. In view of Congress’ continuing support for the states’ supplemental role in regulating
national banks, a presumption against preemption should be applied in future cases raising
preemption claims under the NBA.
The Qu estionable Relevance of Smiley after Cuomo: In Cuomo, Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia also disagreed about whether the OC C’s challenged regulation should be viewed as
preemptive in the first place. In Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,219 the Su preme Court
held (in an opinion w ritten by Justice Scalia) that an OC C regulation definin g the term “interest”
for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 85 did not preempt state law. As noted in Smiley, a 1978 decision of
the Supreme C ourt had previously held that § 85 preemp ted state usu ry laws as a statutory matter.
Smiley therefore concluded that the OCC’s regulation only defined “the substantive (as opposed
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to pre-emptive) meaning of [§ 85].” 220 Accordingly, Smiley concluded that the OCC’s regulation
was not preemptive and did not need to overcome any presu mption against preemption in order to
receive deference under Chevron.
Relying on Smiley, Justice Thomas argued in Cuomo that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 was not
preemptive because the rule merely interpreted “an ambiguous statutory term” (namely,
“visitorial powers”) in order to “clarify the preem ptive scop e of enacted federal law.” 221
However, as Nina Mendelson has pointed out, the reasoning in Smiley is open to serious question,
because the OCC’s expansive “interpretation” of the statutory term “interest” for purposes of § 85
“effectively broadened the statute’s preemp tion of state [usury] law.” 222
Justice Scalia insisted in Cuomo that the OCC’s regulation was indeed preemptive. As he
pointed out, “[a]ny interpretation of ‘visitorial powers’ necessarily ‘declares the pre-emptive
scope of the NBA ,’ . . . If that is not pre-emption, nothing is.”223 Thus, Justice Scalia essentially
repudiated his prior reasoning in Smiley. Based on Cuomo, litigants can now argue that an agency
regulation that defines the “meaning” of a preemptive statute in a way that expands the statute’s
reach should itself be viewed as preemptive. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, such
a rule should receive a lower level of judicial deference and should be subject to the presumption
against preemp tion.
Cuom o’s Implications for the Future of the Dual Banking System and Consum er Protection
For at least three reasons, Cuomo is likely to have a significant impact on future court
cases and legislative proposals dealing with the dual banking system and consumer protection.
First, the decision affirms the right of state officials to seek judicial enforcement of valid, nonpreem pted state laws against national banks. Cuomo provides a significant boost to the dual
banking system and consumer protection by ensuring that national banks, like other lenders, are
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subject to judicial enforcement of applicable state laws by state officials. In contrast, a victory by
the OCC and the Clearing House in Cuomo (i) would have encouraged state banks to convert to
national charters to avoid exposure to state enforcement proceedings, and (ii) would have made it
much more difficult politically for states to enact and imp lement new laws protecting consumers
of financial services, because state officials would have been barred from enforcing such laws
against national banks and their operating subsidiaries.
Second, Cuomo will shift the focus of future preemption cases involving national banks
to the qu estion of which state laws apply to national banks, and it will also encourage legal
challenges to the validity of the OCC’s substantive preemption rules. In 2004, the OCC adopted
sweeping regulations that purport to preempt state laws in four broadly-defined areas – real estate
lending, other lending, deposit-taking, and other federally-authorized “activities.” In all four
areas, the OCC ’s rules (i) preempt state laws if they “obstruct, impair, or condition a national
bank’s ability to fully exercise its powers to conduct activities authorized under Federal law,” and
(ii) allow state laws to apply to national banks only if such law s “establish the legal infrastructure
that makes [it] practicable” for national banks to conduct their federally-authorized activities.224
The practical effect of the OCC’s “infrastructure” theory, as embodied in the 2004 preemption
rules, is to establish a regime of “de facto field preemption,” in which “only those state laws that
promote the ability of national ban ks to [conduct a banking business] will remain app licable.” 225
Cuomo strikes a significant blow at the O CC ’s claim of exclusive preemptive authority
over the banking activities of national banks. As previously discussed, Cuomo declared that
“States . . . have always enforced their general laws against national banks – and have enforced
their banking-related laws against national banks for at least 85 years, as evidenced in St.
Louis.” 226 Cuomo thus reaffirmed the presumptive app licability of state laws to national banks,
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and Cuomo also vitiated the precedential force of Watters’ arguably broader view of NBA
preem ption.
In addition, Cuomo addressed and rejected the OCC’s assertions that (i) the NBA
generally preempts state laws that “affect the content or extent of the Federally-authorized
business of banking,” and (ii) the NB A permits the application of state law only if it “establishes
the legal infrastructure that surrounds and supports the ability of national banks . . . to do
business.” 227 In Cuomo, the Court declared that the OCC’s asserted “distinction between
‘implementation’ of ‘infrastructure’ and judicial enforcement of other [state] laws can be found
now here within the text of the [NBA ]. This passage . . . attempts to do w hat C ongress declined to
do: exempt national banks from all state banking laws, or at least enforcem ent of those laws.” 228
Cuomo creates serious doubts about the validity of the OC C’s substantive preemption rules,
because those rules rely on the same purported distinction between nonp reempted state
“infrastructure” laws and other state laws that the OCC claims are preempted if they place any
“condition” on authorized national bank activities.229
Third, Cuomo dramatically changes the legal status quo for debates about the adoption of
new federal legislation to provide greater protection for consumers of financial services. In June
2009, the Treasury Department published a comprehensive plan for financial regulatory reform.230
One of the key elements of the Treasury plan is its proposal for a new “Consumer Financial
Protection Agency” (CFPA). The proposed CFPA would have broad authority to issue and
enforce consumer protection regulations applicable to all providers of financial services,
including national banks and federal thrifts.231
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In July 2009, Representative Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, introduced a proposed bill (H.R. 3126) to create the CFPA. Like the Treasury plan,
Subtitle D of H.R. 3126 would preserve the states’ authority to enact laws that give additional
protections to consumers beyond those established by the CFPA ’s regulations. Such
supplemental state laws would be applicable on a nondiscriminatory basis to all financial service
providers, including national banks, federal thrifts and their subsidiaries and agents. 232 In
addition, S ubtitle D would empow er state attorneys general, after consulting with the CFPA, to
bring judicial proceedings to enforce applicable state laws against all financial service
providers. 233
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuomo, the OCC and national banks might have
claimed – with some arguable support from Watters – that Subtitle D of H.R. 3 126 would
constitute a significant departure from the legal status quo governing the dual banking system.
After Cuomo, how ever, state officials an d consumer groups have a persuasive basis for their
position that Subtitle D represents an appropriate congressional endorsemen t of the states’
legitimate role in regulating financial institutions and protecting consumers.
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